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The Norwegian aquaculture industry has grown and developed substantially since its mere 
beginning in the 1970s (Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet, 2015; PwC, 2016b; Statistisk 
sentralbyrå, 2018c). Governmental regulation of the industry has developed accordingly, with 
shifting intentions from ensuring local ownership and jobs, to the newfound focus on 
sustainability (Asche & Bjørndal, 2011; Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet, 2015; Schwach et 
al., 2015).  
 
The aim of this thesis is to estimate the economic effects of the recently implemented 
Production Area Regulation on commercial fish farming companies. Existing bioeconomic 
theory does not take into account the capacity constraints faced by the industry participants, 
and we suggest such an extension to the theoretical models. The inclusion of capacity 
constraints enables the calculation of changes in rotation length and the corresponding 
willingness-to-pay for changes in capacity, which in turn can be used to evaluate the effects of 
the regulation. A growth model and a price model are estimated based on the empirical data 
obtained, which in turn are utilized in the calculation of the overall economic effects of the 
regulation.   
 
Our findings suggest that the introduction of capacity constraints leads to shorter rotation 
lengths than what is optimal for Norwegian fish farmers. The average willingness-to-pay for 2 
% increased capacity is 99.10 NOK/kg. Overall, the regulation will lead to an increase in profits 
per production license of NOK 410 485. The variation between the production areas are large, 
with changes in profits ranging from -6.2 million to almost 2.3 million per production license. 
Assumptions about interest rate, mortality rate, number of fish, costs, prices and growth largely 
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Norway is the largest producer of farmed salmonids in the world, and the World Bank 
highlights the production of salmonids as one of the most cost-efficient production methods of 
animal protein, and an important source of seafood to an emerging global population (2013). 
Norway thus has an excellent opportunity to supply the world population with an important 
source of food, both now and in the future. Simultaneously, the aquaculture industry is facing 
major challenges regarding sustainability which must be dealt with in order to increase 
production (Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet, 2015). These sustainability challenges resulted 
in the implementation of a new regulation of the industry in Norway in October 2017.  
1.1 Motivation and Purpose 
The Norwegian aquaculture industry has gone through major developments since its 
commercial beginning in the early 1970s. Substantial changes has been made in both market 
structure, production methods and technology; resulting in a total production of almost 1.2 
million ton in 2016 (Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet, 2015; PwC, 2016b; Statistisk 
sentralbyrå, 2018c). It is projected that the Norwegian production of salmonids will reach 5 
million ton in 2050 with the current growth in production efficiency and demand, which thus 
constitutes a fourfold increase from today’s production level (Olafsen, Winther, Olsen, & 
Skjermo, 2012). 
 
As the industry has developed, so has the industry regulation. The first regulation of the industry 
was implemented in 1973, and since then the objective of governmental regulation has varied 
from ensuring local ownership and jobs in the 1980s and 1990s, to controlling the production 
with the use of feed quota schemes in the 2000s, up until today where sustainable operations 
have become the main focus as a result of increasing environmental challenges (Asche & 
Bjørndal, 2011; Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet, 2015; Schwach et al., 2015). The newfound 
sustainability focus led to the implementation of the Production Area Regulation in October 
2017, which aims at ensuring the advancement of the aquaculture industry within the 
parameters set for sustainable development (Produksjonsområdeforskriften, 2017). In this 
regulation, the production capacity is regulated jointly for 13 appointed geographical areas. The 




the infestation pressure of salmon lice on wild stocks of salmon. Areas with a high infestation 
pressure will be imposed a capacity decrease, while areas with a low infestation pressure will 
be granted a capacity increase. 
 
The regulation has been criticized by industry participants, law makers and stakeholders for 
being complicated and for creating heterogenetic economic impacts, which makes it 
challenging for fish farming companies to estimate their respective economic consequence and 
to adjust their behavior accordingly (Sjømat Norge, Norsk Industri, & NSL, 2017). 
 
Limited studies of the economic impact of the Production Area Regulation on company level 
have been conducted by policy makers, and no empirical study has been conducted to analyze 
the degree of heterogeneity in the economic effects. In addition, no theoretical extension of 
bioeconomic theory describes the impact of changes in capacity on optimal production of 
salmonids.  
1.2 Research Question 
We will in this thesis answer the following research question: 
 
What are the economic effects of the Production Area Regulation on commercial fish 
farming companies? 
 
Several objectives will be fulfilled in order to answer the research question. We will first 
introduce an extension to the bioeconomic theory to analyze how capacity constraints affect 
optimal rotation length of generations of fish. This theoretical extension will allow us to analyze 
how optimal rotation length is affected by changes in capacity according to the Production Area 
Regulation. The changes in optimal rotation length will be used to estimate the corresponding 
changes in present value of future profits per production license and the fish farmers’ 
willingness-to-pay for increased capacity. Based on these estimations, we will provide a 
discussion of the heterogeneity in the economic effects between the different regulative areas. 
 
The analysis will be based on empirical estimations of a growth function for each production 




salmonids. The growth function will be estimated using monthly production data from 945 fish 
farming companies in the period of 2005 to 2016, which allow us to estimate the average weight 
of an individual fish as a function of time after the fish has been released into the sea. 
1.3 Structure 
The structure of the thesis is as following: Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the Norwegian 
aquaculture industry including an overview of the historical economic development, as well as 
production method and growth conditions of salmon farming. In Chapter 3, we introduce an 
overview of the historical regulative development, as well the content and purpose of the 
Production Area Regulation. Chapter 4 is devoted to the introduction of the bioeconomic 
theoretical framework, while Chapter 5 gives an introduction to the data set used in the 
empirical analysis. Chapter 6 introduces the empirical framework of the analysis, and the 
respective regression results will be evaluated in Chapter 7. Finally, we conduct an economic 
analysis and provide a discussion of the economic effects of the Production Area Regulation in 






2. The Norwegian Aquaculture Industry 
This chapter provides an introduction to the Norwegian aquaculture industry, with an overview 
of the historical economic development in Section 2.1 and 2.2. A description of the production 
method of salmonids is provided in Section 2.3, while biological growth conditions are 
described in Section 2.4. By the end of the chapter, the reader will have been provided with a 
basic understanding of the biology of fish farming, as well as current challenges in the industry. 
This knowledge constitutes a good basis for understanding the current regulative regime of the 
industry, as well as the content of the empirical growth model introduced in Chapter 6. 
2.1 About the Aquaculture Industry 
Aquaculture refers to cultivation of organisms in sea or fresh water and includes breeding, 
rearing and harvesting of fish, shellfish and plants (Store norske leksikon, 2018). Fish farming 
has grown to be a sustainable and important source of protein to an emerging global population, 
as fisheries approach their maximum take of natural deposits of seafood. The World Bank 
projects that aquaculture will supply 60 % of all fish destined for human consumption by 2030, 
which thus will constitute the prime source of seafood in the world (2013). 
 
Early records show that aquaculture originated in eastern Asia about 4 000 years ago, when 
fishermen deduced the practice of aquaculture from storage of surplus wild catch in small 
enclosures (Ling & Mumaw, 1977). Salmon aquaculture was not economically efficient until 
the 1970s, when technological improvements and increased demand lead to a rapid expansion 
of the industry (Flåten & Skonhoft, 2014; Heen, Monahan, & Utter, 1993). The global 
production of salmonids increased from 65 thousand ton in 1970 to 3.3 million ton in 2015 (The 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United States, 2018), and the World Bank projects a 
global production of 5 million ton in 2030 (2013). 
 
Norway has traditionally been a large seafood nation due to its long coastline with rich marine 
resources. Large investments in research and development within aquaculture production 
technology, as well as ideal temperature conditions has made Norway the largest producer of 






production in 2016 was valued at approximately 64 billion NOK and was created by an industry 
employment of 7700 people (Statistisk sentralbyrå, 2018a, 2018c). 
 
There are several major challenges for the Norwegian aquaculture industry to overcome in the 
years ahead. Lice and diseases affect the overall fish welfare, which must be sustained as the 
industry grows. In addition, wild salmon are threatened by lice infections from aquaculture 
facilities and escaped farmed salmon may lead to genetic dilution of wild salmon cultures 
(Teknologirådet, 2012). Also, pollution from fish excrement, surplus feed and medicaments 
constitutes environmental challenges.  
 
Furthermore, technological enhancements of offshore and land-based fish farming facilities 
may disrupt the comparative advantage of the Norwegian coastline. As mentioned, it is 
projected that the Norwegian production of salmonids will reach 5 million ton in 2050 if current 
environmental and disease challenges are solved, together with successful innovations in feed 
and production technology (Olafsen et al., 2012). A predictable regulative regime is essential 
to realize this economic potential, and the implementation of the Production Area Regulation 
aims at meeting this objective. The Production Area Regulation will be introduced more in 
detail in Chapter 3. 
2.2 Economic Development  
2.2.1 Production and Productivity 
The Norwegian aquaculture industry has experienced a huge expansion in salmon production 
since its commercialization during the 1970s. One can see from Figure 1 that the value of 
Norwegian aquaculture production has increased exponentially since the 1980s, and that 







Figure 1 Value of Norwegian Seafood Production (Statistisk sentralbyrå, 2018b, 2018c) 
Figure 2 illustrates the Norwegian total production of salmonids, the number of licenses from 
1995 and the average production per license. During the same period, the number of fish 
farming locations has been reduced from its peak of 1806 locations in 2000 to 986 locations in 
2017 (Andreassen & Robertsen, 2014; Fiskeridirektoratet, 2018b). Even though the number of 
fish farming locations has decreased, the total production has increased due to the increase in 
locations’ size and utilization, which is represented by increased production per license. 
Increased productivity, defined as the production in kilograms per man-labor-year, is another 
explanatory factor of increased industry production (Fiskeridirektoratet, 2017a). 
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The development in sales price over time is illustrated in Figure 3. The year of 2016 was a 
historically good year for Norwegian salmon farmers, with an average price of 51.02 NOK/kg. 
This represented an increase in price of 47.31 % from 2015 to 2016 (Fiskeridirektoratet, 2017a).  
 
Figure 3 Price for Norwegian salmonids, numbers adjusted to 2015 level (Fiskeridirektoratet, 2009, 2017b; Statistisk 
sentralbyrå, 2018d) 
The price of salmon is dependent on a variety of factors related to supply and demand, amongst 
them the weight of the fish, as illustrated in Figure 4. The fish are grouped into weight classes 
when determining price, where the category 1-2 are fish that are 1 to 2 kilos, 2-3 are fish that 
are 2 to 3 kilos and so forth. The prices are head on gutted prices adjusted for inflation using 
2015 as reference year. The fact that large fish normally are more expensive per kilo than small 
fish becomes evident in the graph, as well as the fact that the price differences vary according 






















































Figure 4 Price development for selected weight classes from January 2012 until December 2016, numbers adjusted to 2015 
level (Fishpool; Statistisk sentralbyrå, 2018d) 
2.2.3 Cost 
The exceptional development in salmon prices resulted in record levels for profits, earning per 
kilo and operating margins in 2016. The challenges faced by the industry has at the same time 
led to higher operating costs and lower productivity. Production cost per kilo was in 2016 30.60 
NOK on average, an increase from the lowest recorded level in 2005 at 17.76 NOK. It is 
important to emphasize that the dispersion between companies is quite large, with best-
performers having production costs at around 15 NOK/kg.  
 
The main cost drivers for a fish farm are smolt costs, feed costs, wages, and other operating 
costs (Fiskeridirektoratet, 2017b).  From 2015 to 2016, all these cost items increased, with the 
largest increase in other operating costs per kilo, as illustrated in Figure 5. The increase in other 
operating costs results largely from increased costs related to fish health, environmental issues 
and maintenance. The increase in feed costs has also been substantial in recent years, a result 
of a weak Norwegian krone and the transition to new ingredients in feed (Fiskeridirektoratet, 







Figure 5 Development in major operating cost items from 2005 to 2016. Prices not adjusted for inflation (Fiskeridirektoratet, 
2018d) 
2.3 Production Method and Value Chain 
Salmon farming is an intensive and closed production process determined by a high degree of 
human control during all stages of the fish’ life cycle and with no dependence on the wild 
population of the species. Salmo salar, Chinook and Coho are the farmed species of salmon, 
together with salmon trout. Salmo salar, which is also called Atlantic salmon, is native to the 
Atlantic Ocean and is farmed in Norway, amongst other producing countries, while Chinook 
and Coho are Pacific species (Asche & Bjørndal, 2011). 
 
The salmon roe is gathered from domesticated broodstock and hatched under controlled 
environments in January each year. The fry will feed on the contents of its yolk sack for the 
first month, before the human controlled feeding process is initiated. At a size of about 5 grams, 
the fry will reach the fingerling phase and develop the characteristics of salmon. The Atlantic 
salmon reaches the smoltification phase after 16 months, which is a complex physical change 
to adapt to the life in saltwater. The Atlantic salmon are then released to sea pens for the grow-
out phase up to marketable weights of 2 to 8 kg during the course of 12 to 24 months. This is 
the most commercial important stage of the production as the most growth-relevant decisions 






schedules, density and preventive lice and disease measures. All salmon species must be 
harvested before spawning, as the Pacific species will die, and the Atlantic salmon will 
experience a degradation of quality. This occurs about 28 months after the smoltification of 
Atlantic salmon and Chinook, and only 16 months for Coho, although large differences in 
spawning time may be observed within in the same year class (Asche & Bjørndal, 2011). 
 
The value chain of salmon production consists of several stages; production, processing and 
sale to end user. Several fish farming companies are vertically integrated with their own 
production of fry and smolt, as well as their own feed production. After harvesting, the fish are 
slaughtered and processed into different consumer products like slices, filets and cutlets, before 
transported and sold to the end users (Teknologirådet, 2012). Several sectors are influenced by 
the aquaculture industry and include feed producers, breeders, equipment producers, research 
institutions and transportation service providers (Andreassen & Robertsen, 2014). 
2.4 Growth Conditions for Salmon Farming 
A variety of factors affect the growth of salmon during the grow out phase, among them water 
temperature, light, smolt quality, feeding, mortality, density, diseases and parasites.   
2.4.1 Temperature and Daylight 
Salmon is a cold-blooded animal, which means that temperature is one of the most important 
variables affecting growth, together with feed (Boeuf & Le Bail, 1999). The temperatures in 
Norway vary across seasons and geographic areas, translating to varying growth conditions for 
the fish farms (Thyholdt, 2014). The northern parts of Norway have lower sea temperatures 
than the areas further south, all year round, in addition to seasonal variations throughout the 
year. The average temperature for the 13 newly established production areas is shown in Figure 
6 below.  Production area 1 is the southernmost area, and thus the registered temperatures in 






production area 13 is the northernmost production area with the lowest registered temperatures, 
reaching only 10 °C in August. 
 
Figure 6 Average temperatures measured in Celsius in different production areas during a year (Barentswatch.no, 2017) 
Recent studies show that the highest growth rate was achieved at temperatures around 13 °C 
(Jørgensen et al., 2014). At lower temperatures the fish has lower appetite and thus eats less, 
resulting in lower growth. At higher temperatures, on the other hand, challenges such as 
parasites, algae and oxygen levels become prevailing, resulting in higher mortality rates 
(Jørgensen et al., 2014).   
 
Hours of daylight also influences the growth rate of salmon (Boeuf & Le Bail, 1999). Norway 
is a country with major variations in hours of daylight, both varying with seasons and with 
geographical areas. In the areas north of the Artic Circle the night is 24 hours from November 
until January, and nonexistent during summer, known as midnight sun (Yr, 2012). The fish 
farming industry has since the early 1980s stimulated the biological processes of the fish 
through manipulation of light conditions by using artificial light.   
2.4.2 Feed  
Feed is the other main explanatory variable for growth. The feed conversion ratio expresses 






Harvest, 2017). Low feed conversion ratio means that the efficiency of feeding is high, i.e. large 
proportions of the feed amount results in increased weight, indicating small amounts of waste. 
The feed conversion is dependent on water temperatures, as aforementioned. Increasing weight 
reduces the feed conversion ratio (Skretting, 2012).   
2.4.3 Density 
Density, measured as kilos per cubic meter of water, also affects the growth of salmon 
(Calabrese, 2017). Research shows that high density increases the stress level of the fish and 
reduces the feed utilization. High density may also lead to aggressive behavior such as biting 
in the dorsal fin (Holm & Søreide, 1993).   
2.4.4 Salmon Lice 
Salmon lice is among the more recent challenges in the Norwegian industry. The lice problem 
causes the industry substantial costs, both directly through the cost of lice treatments, but also 
indirectly through reduced feeding. The fish are starved before treatment, resulting in lower 
growth, and the stress of treatment results in lower appetite in the time after. The lice may also 
cause stress, resulting in reduced growth, reduced swimming capabilities and sometimes death 
(Havforskningsinstituttet, 2017; Hjeltnes, Bang-Jensen, Bornø, Haukaas, & Walde, 2017). 
2.4.5 Smolt 
As mentioned, all smolts are hatched in January due to biological reasons. From there, the 
smolts are released to the sea either during spring or fall. The smolts released during the 
following fall are called zero years, while their siblings that are released during the spring the 
following year are called one years (Asche & Bjørndal, 2011). The growth of spring smolt is 
usually better than the growth of fall smolt due to favorable temperature conditions and higher 






3. Regulation of the Industry 
To better understand the content and aim of the recently implemented Production Area 
Regulation, it is necessary to understand how and why the industry has been regulated in the 
past. In Section 3.1 and 3.2 we describe that the aim of regulation has varied from ensuring 
local ownership and jobs, to limiting production in order to clear markets, until today’s focus 
on sustainable operations. Section 3.3 elaborates the operational characteristics of the MAB 
regulation, while Section 3.4 introduces the Production Area Regulation in detail.  
3.1 1970 until 1996 Local Ownership  
The first regulation of aquaculture in Norway was implemented in 1973 (Asche & Bjørndal, 
2011). Since then, anyone who wanted to operate a fish farm needed a government license to 
do so. The aim of governmental regulation was at this point local ownership and jobs, and each 
company was only allowed to own one license (Schwach et al., 2015). The implementation of 
the regulation lead to the Norwegian Official report 1977:39, which argued that the 
environmental characteristics of Norway was ideal for the development of an extensive 
aquaculture industry, and that government regulation should promote this development (Lysø, 
1977). 
 
As a result, in 1981, the first permanent aquaculture act was passed, followed by an updated 
version in 1985. The local considerations were still strong, which became evident through the 
emphasis on local ownership and the desire to keep production spread out on many small 
companies. From this point, the licenses were to be given out through national licensing rounds 
(Fiskeridepartementet, 1979-1980). Until early 1990s new licenses were given out in large 
amounts, and existing licenses were granted increased capacity (PwC, 2016b). The rapidly 
increasing production lead to outbreaks of diseases. At the same time, prices started falling due 
to increased international competition, launching the Norwegian aquaculture industry into a 
crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
 
Many of the aquaculture companies went bankrupt during this crisis, and the reaction from the 
government was a liberalization of the regulation regime (Aarset, Jakobsen, Iversen, & Ottesen, 






license and removal of requirements for local ownership. This resulted in increased 
consolidation of the industry, illustrated by the fact that in 1991 the ten largest companies 
produced only 8 % of the total production, while the same number was 46 % in 2001 and is 70 
% today (Aarset et al., 2004; Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet, 2015; PwC, 2016b). No new 
licenses were granted in the period 1989 to 2002.  
3.2 1996 until 2018 Market and Sustainability Focus 
In 1996 a feed quota regime was implemented, as an attempt to regulate production after 
dumping accusations from the European Union (Aarset et al., 2004). The feed quota 
arrangement lasted until 1st of January 2005, when the maximum allowed biomass, abbreviated 
MAB, regime was implemented (Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet, 2015). The MAB regime 
introduced that a farmer could not, at any occasion, have more kilos living fish in seawater than 
their granted MAB. 
 
The introduction of the MAB regime marks the start of a sustainability focus for state policies. 
The maximum allowed biomass was divided into two dimensions; farmers were granted a MAB 
limit on licenses, and another limit was set for the location. The MAB limit on licenses was set 
in order to control total national production, while the location MAB was set in order to consider 
the location’s environmental capacity (Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet, 2015). The MAB 
capacity on licenses was set to 780 ton per license for all areas except Finnmark and Troms, 
where the limit was set to 945 ton due to poorer growth conditions. 
 
Since 2002, compensation has been requested by the government for granting of new licenses, 
and from 2009 compensation was also requested for increased capacity on existing licenses. Up 
until this point the license regime was free of charge. The licenses have since the introduction 
of this system been granted in national rounds of licenses, with varying criteria depending on 
the political agenda of the government (Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet, 2015). 
 
Since 2013, the environmental aspects of fish farming have been the main criteria for growth. 
The industry has experienced environmental challenges in regard to salmon lice, diseases, 
escapes, and emissions (Havforskningsinstituttet, 2017). The salmon lice have been the main 






3.3 Operational Characteristics of the MAB Regulation 
To fully understand the MAB regime, and thus the operational changes followed by the 
Production Area Regulation, it is important to know that one license can be connected to several 
locations within an appointed region. The fact that licenses can be connected to several 
locations allows for optimal production planning for the companies that enjoy this flexibility. 
The system allows for better utilization of the MAB, e.g. as the license MAB may be used at 
other locations when one location has to lay fallow after the end of a production cycle. It is 
important to note that the location MAB is set independent of the license MAB, and thus may 
be above, the same, or below the total license MAB. 
 
The companies that process a considerable share of their own fish in the districts of Norway are 
granted so-called maximum inter-regional biomass levels. This means that licenses that are 
normally tied to one specified geographic region can be utilized in more than one region 
(Akvakulturdriftsforskriften, 2008). This allows for further increased flexibility, and the 
argument behind this arrangement is that it is important to keep the value creating processing 
facilities in Norway to ensure jobs and local attachment.  
 
As a result, the MAB-utilization for firms in the industry varies. Conditions such as 
temperature, fish health and productivity also influence how well each firm is able to fully 
utilize the MAB (Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet, 2015). Because of natural conditions such 
as temperature, it is difficult for industry players to fully utilize the MAB all year (Marine 
Harvest, 2017).  
 
On average, a farmer is able to produce around 1 200 ton gutted weight equivalent per year per 
license. Larger companies enjoy more flexibility than smaller ones and are therefore, in theory, 
able to optimize production so that licenses are fully exploited to a larger degree. However, the 
fact that larger companies have a much more complex production planning process may lead 
to less capacity utilization, because it becomes challenging to optimize all parts of the 
production system at the same time. From this line of argument, smaller players may utilize 
their capacity more efficiently. Kontali Analyse and Sintef estimated in 2013 that if all farmers 






2012, the total national production could reach 1.5 million ton with the licenses granted per 
2013 (Nystøyl et al., 2013). 
3.4 About the Production Area Regulation 
The Production Area Regulation was passed by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries 
and became effective on the 15th of October 2017. The process leading up to the final regulation 
started in April 2014 when the government announced the start towards a new regulation regime 
regarding growth in the aquaculture industry (Regjeringen, 2014). 
 
The purpose of the regulation is stated in §1 which can be summarized as ensuring the 
advancement of the aquaculture industry within the parameters set for sustainable development. 
The regulation shall also contribute to value creation along the coast, by creation of production 
areas, and through regulation of production capacity for salmon, trout and rainbow trout 
(Produksjonsområdeforskriften, 2017). 
 
The main idea when the process was initiated, was to ensure predictable and sustainable growth 
for the industry. Up until today, the assignment of growth has been done on ad-hoc basis, 
making the growth potential uncertain for industry participants. The previous growth regimes 
have also allowed for political latitude, thus not necessarily ensuring sustainable growth 
(Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet, 2015). 
3.4.1 Main Content of the Regulation 
The Production Area Regulation changes how the industry is regulated in two main ways. First, 
the industry is divided into 13 production areas which are rated as red, yellow or green based 
on the calculated level of environmental threat the area constitutes. The areas are regulated 
jointly, as opposed to previous regulation regimes, where the locations were regulated on an 
individual level. Second, the industry growth or reduction is based only on chosen 
environmental indicators.  
 
Today, the chosen indicator is the risk of mortality of wild salmon populations due to lice 
infestation. This mortality is estimated by the Institute of Marine Research based on models 






fish, infestation pressure models, and real-life observations, e.g. lice counts from fish farms and 
sea temperatures. The critical limits and effect of the regulation for the different production 
areas are shown in Table 1 (Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet, 2015). The industry, represented 
by the Norwegian Seafood Federation, The Federation of Norwegian Industries, and The 
Norwegian Seafood Association, made a consultative statement in September 2016 where they 
criticized the model and argued that it was not sophisticated enough to constitute the premises 
for the management of the Norwegian aquaculture industry (Sjømat Norge et al., 2017). The 
chosen environmental indicator may change over time, as new challenges become prevailing. 
Table 1 Critical limits and effects of the Production Area Regulation 





It is probable that <10 
% of the population 
dies due to lice 
infection 
It is probable that 10-
30 % of the 
population dies due to 
lice infection 
It is probable that > 30 
% of the population 
dies due to lice 
infection 
Effect of the 
regulation 
2 % growth on 
existing MAB 
4 % growth offered 
through auction 
No change in MAB 
6 % reduction in 
MAB 
The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries (2015) state that the challenges regarding salmon 
lice cannot be solved by regulating the industry on location level like previous regulation has 
done, but needs to be handled through an overall management linked to acceptable 
environmental exposure for a defined area. The defined areas have been determined based on 
dispersion analysis done by the Institute of Marine Research. The analysis quantified the level 
of salmon lice infection between the fish farms. As a result, the coast of Norway was divided 
into 13 areas as shown on the map in Figure 7. The environmental status of the areas will we 







Figure 7 The newly established production areas and their given status per January 2018 
The area status is the decision variable for changes in production capacity, operationalized as 
change in license MAB. No changes are made to location MAB, so companies that are restricted 
by this will have to apply for increased location capacity as before. This is not discussed in 
further detail here, as the Production Area Regulation only regulates license MAB.  
 
If an area is given green status, meaning that the threat to wild salmon is considered to be low, 
the farms in the area may grow. The price of growth is set to 120 000 NOK per ton (Forskrift 
om kapasitetsøkning for tillatelser til akvakultur 2017–2018, 2017). The existing farms in the 
green areas are granted 2 % growth if they choose to apply for it. An additional 4 % growth is 
auctioned out, allowing for new entrants to be established. Companies could in January 2018 
apply for growth for the first time since the implementation of the Production Area Regulation. 
47 companies choose to do so, amounting to a total of 7 898 ton of growth distributed on 449 
out 461 potential licenses in the areas. The auctioning of the remaining 4 % will be completed 
before the summer of 2018 (Fiskeridirektoratet, 2018a).  
 
If an area is given yellow status, meaning that the threat to wild salmon is considered to be 
moderate, no changes in MTB is initiated, and the locations in the area can keep operations 







If an area is given red status, meaning that the threat to wild salmon is considered to be high, 
the production capacity is reduced by 6 % (Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet, 2015). The 
reduction will not be realized in the ongoing round of capacity adjustment, as the companies in 
the red areas are to be given time to adjust to the new regulation. Downward adjustments will 
be completed in 2019 if the area is still assessed to be red (Regjeringen, 2017). 
 
To sum up, the industry has been regulated in different ways since the beginning of the 1970s. 
The current MAB regime was introduced in 2005, making living biomass in sea the most 
important constraining parameter for fish farmers. The Production Area Regulation introduced 
in the end of 2017 has changed the way the industry is regulated by tying future growth to the 
chosen environmental indicator and dividing the coastline into 13 production areas. The goal 
of the regulation is to create a framework for predictable and sustainable growth. The regulation 
has been partially implemented, and the first round of application for growth has been 
undertaken. Decreased production capacity in red areas will only be enforced from 2019.
4. Theoretical Framework  
This chapter introduces the theoretical framework which will constitute the bioeconomic 
foundation for our later analysis. In Section 4.1, we conduct a literature review which 
introduces the past and current literature on optimal harvesting, before moving on to the 
introduction of the optimal rotation problem as proposed by Asche and Bjørndal in Section 
4.2 (2011). Lastly, we propose two extensions to the model; introducing the concept of 
capacity constraints and deriving an expression for willingness-to-pay for capacity increase, 
in addition to introducing fallowing to the model.    
4.1 Literature Review  
Bjørndal (1988) developed the first optimal harvesting model for aquaculture, founded on the 
tree rotation work done by Faustmann in the 1850s (Asche & Bjørndal, 2011). Faustmann 
developed a model for determining the optimal rotation length for forestry and propose that a 
tree should be cut when the marginal increase in the value of the tree is equal to the alternative 
cost of investment in trees and land. In his model, Faustmann assumes that a new rotation can 
start immediately after a rotation is finished (Guttormsen, 2001).  
 
Bjørndal creates a biological model defining release of smolts, growth rate and mortality rate 
before introducing economic aspects such as costs and interest rate, creating a bioeconomic 
model for determining the optimal harvesting time in aquaculture (1988). He does not take 
into account the rotation problem, and thus only analyze a one-time investment in fish. The 
model assumes that a fixed amount of fish is released at time t, and that over time some fish 
die, and the others grow according to a defined growth function. The model suggests that a 
farmer should harvest when the proportional increase in the biomass is equal to the interest 
rate, known as the Fisher rule in forestry literature (Bjørndal, 1988). In his initial work, 
Bjørndal further introduces several variable costs such as feed costs, harvesting costs, 
insurance costs and release costs to the optimization problem (1988).  
 
The model introduced by Bjørndal has later been extended by several authors. Arnason (1992) 





independent (1993) and density dependent growth (1995). Asche and Guttormsen (2002) 
analyzed weight dependent prices, concluding that there are cycles in the relative prices for 
different sizes of farmed fish. These price cycles were incorporated into the bioeconomic 
model by Guttormsen in 2001. In addition, Guttormsen extended the model to take into 
account that smolts cannot be released all year round due to biological constraints regarding 
availability of smolts, implying that a new rotation cannot necessarily be initiated when the 
previous one is over. The conclusion of this work is that both relative price cycles and limited 
access to smolts influence the rotation length and the weight per fish at harvest (Guttormsen, 
2001).  
4.2 The Optimal Rotation Problem 
In The Economics of Salmon Aquaculture (2011), Asche and Bjørndal present a bioeconomic 
model for determining the optimal harvesting time for farmed salmon. The model assumes 
that variable costs are the only costs relevant for the decision, and salmon prices are fixed to 
simplify the analysis. Uncertainty in the parameter values is not considered, neither is the 
stochastic fluctuations in growth.  
4.2.1 Number of Fish 
The fish that are released into a pen is called a year class. In the model, the number of fish 
released for each year class is considered exogenous. Assuming a constant mortality rate, the 
number of fish can be expressed as: 
 
!(#) = &'()(*) (1) 
 
The model assumes that at time 0 a given number of fish are released in the pen, denoted R 
for recruits in the equation above, and that the number of fish is reduced by the mortality rate 
M over time. 
4.2.2  Weight per Fish 






+’(#) = -(+(#),!(#), /(#)) (2) 
 
The change in weight is here given by the growth function, which is a function of weight per 
fish, number of fish and feed quantity. The growth model can also be extended to take other 
factors such as light and water temperature into account. The individual fish will grow towards 
a maximum value, where +’(#̃) = 0.  
4.2.3 Total Biomass 
Now, the total biomass B(t) for the year class can be expressed as a function of number of 
individuals and weight: 
 
1(#) = !(#)+(#) = &'()*+(#) (3) 
 
All individuals are assumed to have the same weight in this model. In reality, this may not be 
the case, as fish grow at different rates in the pen, but it works as a representation of the average 





− 561(#) (4)  
 
Where the first term in the bracket is the relative growth rate of the fish. In the beginning, this 
rate is assumed to be higher than the mortality rate, so that biomass increases over time, i.e. 
B’(t) > 0. When the relative growth rate equals the mortality rate, the biomass is at its 
maximum. The time t when biomass reaches its maximum is denoted t0, i.e. B’(t0) = 0. The 
total biomass will reach its maximum before the individuals reach their maximum weight, 
because individual growth is here cancelled out by the mortality rate, w’(t)/w(t) < M > 0.   
4.2.4 Value of Total Biomass 
The model is initially developed with zero costs, and the value of the biomass is expressed as: 
 






Where p(w(t)) is the price per kilo fish, which normally varies for different sizes of fish. 
Assuming that the price is higher for larger fish, we have that p’(w) > 0. This is the case for 
reasonable weights, and thus the assumption is valid (Fishpool). The number of recruits and 
the growth curve are here considered exogenous variables. The time when biomass reaches its 
maximum value is given by tmax when V’(tmax) = 0.  The biomass reaches its maximum value 
at the same time or later than the maximum weight of the year class, depending on price for 
different weight classes. If price is higher for larger fish, then tmax > t0, as opposed to the 
situation where price is independent of size which gives tmax = t0.  
 
In sum, the following relation exists; the individuals reach their maximum weight at the same 
time or later than the total year class reaches its maximum weight, due to mortality. The value 
of the biomass reaches its maximum earlier or at the same time as the year class reaches its 
maximum weight, depending on price conditions, i.e. #;<= ≤ #? ≤ #̃. 
 










Where the first term in the brackets expresses the change in price due to growth, the second 
the natural mortality rate, and the third the growth rate.  
4.2.5 Optimal Rotation Length  
The model is further developed to the find optimal rotation length taking into account an 
infinite number of rotations. Optimal rotation length is the time t which maximizes the net 
revenues for all future rotations.  
 
To enable an evaluation of the farmers investments, one must calculate the present value of 
the investments. The discounting term G
HIJ(G
 is thus introduced. Assuming that production 
capacity is constant over time, and that the parameter values are constant, the fish farmer will 

























Rewriting the expression so that it expresses change in the value of the biomass, it becomes 
clear that the last term is the present value of future profits: 
 





Optimal harvesting is given by the point in time where the marginal increase in the fish stock 
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This expression illustrates that optimal harvesting time is given when the marginal revenue of 
keeping fish in the sea is equal to the marginal cost.  
 
4.2.6 Production Costs per Kilo 
Introducing production costs into the model, the value of biomass can be modified to: 
 






Where C represents the production cost per kilo. This, in turn, changes the profit function from 



















If p’(w) = 0, i.e. the price is independent of weight per fish, the introduction of production 
costs does not change the optimal harvesting time. If p’(w) > 0, the optimal harvesting time 
increases, as the first term in the equation is reduced.  
4.3 Extensions to the Model  
4.3.1 Capacity Constraints 
One of the elements disregarded by the model presented, is capacity constraints. To our 
knowledge, no other authors have addressed this issue either. For a Norwegian fish farmer, 
the capacity constraint is an important decision variable which influences the harvesting time. 
The model assumes that the farmer harvests when the marginal revenue is equal to the 
marginal cost, at time t*. In a scenario with capacity constraints, one may find that a farmer is 
forced to harvest earlier than what is optimal according to the theory. The capacity constraint, 
imposed by the fact that total biomass cannot exceed MAB limit at any time can be expressed 
as: 
 
1* ≤ 5U1 (16) 
 
For farmers facing a binding capacity constraint, an increase in capacity can be realized by 
either increasing rotation length, or by releasing more recruits. In this model, the number of 





rotation length. From equation (6), we can see that the effects of increased rotation length on 
the value of biomass, is driven by several effects. Given that mortality remains unchanged 
with increased rotation length, the profitability of increased capacity is driven by two effects; 
a pure volume effect and a price effect. The pure volume effect is reflected in the third term 
of the equation, where increased weight leads to increased value of biomass. The price effect 
is reflected in the first term of the equation, where the fact that the characteristics of the price 
function influences the profitability of increased rotation length. In scenarios where price is 
increasing with weight per fish, the farmer gains both the pure volume effect of being able to 
postpone harvest and thus harvest larger fish, and the price effect of increased price for larger 
fish.  
 







This expression defines that a farmer’s willingness-to-pay per capacity increase is the change 
in profits divided by the change in capacity. The unit for q	is NOK per kilo. 
 
Rewriting the expression, the change in profits is expressed as: 
 
∆K = 	q	 ∗ 	∆[\8\[]#^ (18) 
 
We note that other indirect effects such as changes in costs, prices, investment levels or other 
factors is not included in the calculation of change in profit. 
4.3.2 Fallowing 
For an infinite number of rotations, the famers aim at maximizing the profits. The profits can 
initially be expressed as: 
 






Introducing the concept of fallowing, assuming a fallow period of 2 months duration for each 
production cycle, the expression can be adjusted to take this into account. The following 
expression can be deduced:  
 
5\_	K(#) = 7(#)'(M(*c`) + 7(#)'(`M(*c`) + ⋯+ 7(#)'(bM(*c`) + (20) 
 
Which in turn can be rewritten:  
 
5\_	K(#) = 7(#)('(M(*c`))G + 7(#)('(M(*c`))` + ⋯+ 7(#)('(M(*c`))b (21) 
 













We will in this chapter give an introduction to the data set, which will be used to create a 
growth model for each production area and a price model. This will be used to estimate the 
average weight per fish and consequently the economic effects of the Production Area 
Regulation in Chapter 8. Section 5.1 is devoted to the process of creating the data set with a 
short description of relevant variables included. Next, we describe the data filtration and 
cleaning procedure, which has been highly crucial to obtain valid regression results. We 
present descriptive statistics in Section 5.3 and discuss the uncertainty of the variables in 
Section 5.4. 
5.1 Creation of Data Set 
For the analysis, we have created a panel data set consisting of monthly biomass related 
observations for 945 fish farming locations in Norway. Biomass data have been forwarded by 
the Norwegian Directories of Fisheries for the period of 2005 to 2016 under a research license. 
All fish farming companies are obligated to report at the end of each month biomass per pen 
per fish farming location, as well as feed usage and loss per pen (Akvakulturdriftsforskriften, 
2008; Akvakulturloven, 2005). The biomass data are summarized over all pens for each 
location, and we aggregate the different species of salmon and trout into one common species 
of salmonid. Production data is not reported to the Directorate of Fisheries if a location has 
been fallowed in a given month, and we have thus created monthly observations with zero 
biomass, feed usage and loss for these months to secure a continuous time frame in the data 
set. 
 
Norwegian fish farming companies are obligated to report average lice counts per fish on all 
locations on a weekly basis, as well as suspicion of or detection of pancreas disease (PD) and 
infectious salmon anemia (ILA), in addition to different types of lice treatment and 
temperature (Forskrift om lakselusbekjempelse, 2012). This data have been downloaded from 
BarentsWatch for the period of 2012 to 2016 (Barentswatch.no, 2017). The weekly lice count 
and temperature observations are averaged on a monthly basis, while disease and lice 






Price data are obtained from the Nasdaq Salmon Index as weekly reported exporter’s selling 
price for head on gutted salmon at different size intervals, where we added a categorial variable 
for month and year for the period of 2005 to 2016 (Fishpool; Nasdaq). The price data is 
adjusted for inflation with 2015 as the reference year. Data on the Norwegian consumer price 
index is obtained from Statistics Norway (Statistisk sentralbyrå, 2018d). 
 
The 945 fish farming locations represented in the data set are locations that have been allocated 
to a given production area according to the Production Area Regulation (Nærings- og 
fiskeridepartementet, 2017). A list of allocations has been downloaded from the Directories 
of Fisheries, including information on maximum allowed biomass per license and location 
(Fiskeridirektoratet, 2018f). By restricting the data set to the above-mentioned locations, we 
are focusing the analysis on operational fish farming locations that are producing edible 
salmon and salmon trout, thus excluding locations that have been closed within the time 
period, in addition to locations that are producing broodstock and research facilities. 
 
The data set is a panel data set consisting of 136 080 observations and 49 variables with fish 
farming location as cross-sectional variable and monthly date per year as time variable. An 
overview of the most relevant variables in the data set is presented in the table below. 
Table 2 Overview of the Most Relevant Variables in the Data Set 
Biomass Reported biomass at the end of each month Kg 
Fish Number of fish reported at the end of each month Fish 
W_t Average weight per fish Kg 
Lice_grown Average number of grown lice per fish Lice 
Fish_per_pen Average number of fish per pen Fish 
Time Time periods after release Month 
Location  Location ID  Categorical 
Year Year Categorical 
Month  Month  Categorical 





5.2 Data Filtration and Cleaning 
We have conducted several filtration procedures in the data set in order to conduct a valid 
estimation of weight per fish. To achieve this objective, we had to identify individual 
generations of fish per location, as well as the time periods where the fish were growing. The 
identification of each generation could easily be done visually by plotting the amount of 
biomass against time for a given location. Biomass development for one representative 
location is illustrated in the plot below. 
 
Figure 8 Biomass development over time (Fiskeridirektoratet, 2018c) 
The individual generations of fish can be observed from the plot, as well as the periods were 
the location was fallowed. Running an estimation of weight per fish as function of time on this 
data would give a false interpretation of biomass growth, as periods where the biomass was 
reduced due to harvesting would be interpreted as negative growth, and thus affect the 






To solve the above-mentioned challenge, we had to identify the periods of harvest to remove 
all time periods where the biomass was not growing. To achieve this objective, we started by 
identifying the periods where the smolt was first released for each generation by identifying 
an increase in the amount of fish after a period with zero biomass. This made us also able to 
classify the release as a fall or spring release. We were then able to generate a time variable 
counting the time after release and until the location became fallowed. Based on the time 
variable, we generated a unique generation ID, and we were now able to correctly identify 4 
172 unique generations of fish. 
 
Next, we had to generate a variable which identified the time periods where the biomass was 
growing for each location and drop all periods with no biomass growth. This objective was 
achieved by identifying and indicating the observations with intermediate biomass increase 
per generation and dropping all other observations. Furthermore, we had to drop all 
observations within a generation with a lower biomass compared the previous period, as 
dropping all observations that were not classified as growth did not remove all observations 
with intermediate biomass reduction. The number of observations after these procedures was 
46 829. To finalize the data set, we created a variable for the average weight per fish in a given 
time period for each generation and removed all outliers with weight above 10 kilograms. This 
procedure removed 93 observations. We also removed generations with a rotation length under 
6 time periods, as generations with missing values would result in a misclassification of 
generation length. This procedure removed 1 637 observations and 517 potentially 
misclassified generations. Finally, we considered all generations with length above 34 months 
to be outliers and removed the respective observations. This procedure removed 146 
observations and 10 generations. 
5.3 Descriptive Statistics 
We will in this section present descriptive statistics to provide a better understanding of the 
magnitude of the data set. A table of summary statistics for relevant variables is presented in 
Table 3, with overall variation between locations and time, time-independent variation 






The overall mean is the mean of all observations in the data set, with the corresponding 
minimum and maximum values being reported. The overall standard deviation constitutes a 
comparison of a given location’s observed value at a given time period and the mean of all 
locations over all time periods. 
The between standard deviation is interpreted as the variation in unit-level average between 
fish farming locations and constitute a comparison of a location’s mean with the mean of all 
locations independent of time. A between variation equal to zero means that all locations take 
the same value at a given time period. The reported minimum and maximum values are the 
lowest and highest observed location specific mean. 
 
The within standard deviation is calculated as the unit-level variation over the sample period 
and constitute a comparison of a location’s observed value at a given time period and its mean 
for all time periods. The corresponding within minimum and maximum values represent the 
lowest and highest observed time-dependent difference for the whole sample. The minimum 
can become negative by definition, as a location may have a lower observed value at a given 
time period compared to its mean. A within variation equal to zero means that all locations 






Table 3 Summary Statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Biomass Overall 1092695 1069291 2340 1.39e+07 
(Kg) Between  550221 38337 4644155 
 Within  938122 -3449350 1.04e+07 
      
Number of fish Overall 782071 438451 5851 5485820 
(Fish) Between  361643 35042 3063494 
 Within  276065 -1444465 3204397 
      
Weight per fish Overall 1.487 1.274 0.038 9.722 
(Kg) Between  0.448 0.198 3.975 
 Within  1.230 -1.749 9.768 
      
Rotation length Overall 18.10 4.842 6 34 
(Months) Between  3.748 6 30 
 Within  3.840 -1.159 34.37 
      
Number of lice Overall 0.122 0.260 0 6.583 
(Lice) Between  0.113 0 1.3 
 Within  0.244 -0.761 6.274 
      
Fish per pen Overall 114684 55051 3862 543681 
(Fish) Between  42392 18757 274419 
 Within  36272 -73784 453318 
The mean value of biomass is 1 092 695, which constitutes an average between all locations 
and in all time periods. We can see that the amount of biomass varies a lot compared to the 
overall mean, both between and within locations. We find this observation to be natural, as 
fish farming locations vary considerably in size. In addition, the biomass will increase 
substantially during the life time of the fish. 
 
Similar to biomass, the mean value of the number of fish constitute an average between all 





farming locations, which can hold up to 5.5 million fish. The overall variation between fish 
farming locations illustrates a large difference in sizes between locations, while a high within 
variation is natural due to harvesting or mortality. 
 
The average weight per fish of all locations in all time periods after release is 1.49 kg, which 
does not seem to vary to a large degree between locations. The maximum size of fish observed 
is 9.72 kg, which is considered to be high compared to commercial sizes. We note that weight 
observations above 10 kg are considered to be outliers and removed from the data set. We can 
observe that the weight per fish varies to a large degree within locations, which is natural due 
to fish growth. 
 
It is highly interesting to look at the descriptive statistics of rotation length. We note that the 
rotation length in this case is defined as the number of months in the grow-out phase from 
release until harvesting is first initiated. The overall average rotation length is 18.10 months 
with an overall standard deviation of 4.84 months. The highest observed rotation length is 34 
months, which is considered to be high, but realistic under certain growth and market 
conditions. We also find it interesting that the rotation lengths within locations varies with an 
average of 3.84 months, indicating that the decision of harvesting is influenced by time-
dependent factors like current market conditions. 
 
The overall average amount of grown female lice per fish is 0.12, which is below the regulative 
limit of 0.50 (Forskrift om lakselusbekjempelse, 2012). The overall standard deviation of 0.26 
illustrates, that on average, the number of lice on a given location does not exceed the limit. It 
is important to keep in mind that the fish farmers seek to minimize the lice level in order to 
not exceed the regulative limit. We can observe that the number of lice varies significantly 
between and within locations. 
 
Looking at the overall mean of the number of fish per pen, we can observe that it is under the 
regulative limit of 200 000 fish per pen, and the overall observed maximum of 543 681 fish is 
forbidden according to current regulations (Akvakulturdriftsforskriften, 2008). The overall 
standard deviation indicates that the average deviation from the mean does not result in a 
violation of the limit. We have to keep in mind that the number of fish is usually reduced due 
to natural mortality or harvesting, and that the overall mean does not represent the average 





indicates considerable differences in sizes between fish farming locations, while the within 
standard deviation indicates that the fish stocks are usually reduced during the rotation period 
and at harvesting. 
5.4 Uncertainty in Variables 
As mentioned, it is compulsory for all locations to report total biomass in the sea at the end of 
each month. The reported biomass numbers are estimates, as it is challenging for fish farmers 
to know exactly how many fish there are in each pen, and how much each fish weight. It is 
reason to believe that the measurement error is noise that may bias our estimates. The biomass 
estimation is today based on growth models, section tests, and data from biomass measuring 
frames (Høy, Sunde, & Vanhauwaert Bjelland, 2013). The estimations prove to be quite 
accurate in sum, illustrated by work done by SINTEF in 2013, where 240 selected pens in sum 
had a deviation between reported biomass and harvested biomass of 604 ton out of 134 608 
harvested ton, i.e. a deviation of 0.45 % (Høy et al., 2013). With this being said, the accuracy 
varies between pens, and 50 % of the pens had more than 3 % deviation in biomass estimation. 
 
The data provided from the Directorate of Fisheries were presented on a pen level. The data 
have been aggregated to location level, allowing for the removal of noise in the data set 
resulting from the relocation of fish between pens within the same location. When estimating 
weight per fish at a given location, we are assuming that the individuals at a location remain 
unchanged during the production cycle, i.e. that fish are not moved between locations. 
 
As the goal is to create a growth model, we considered adjusting total biomass for the weight 
of released fish, to avoid that the model identified release of recruits as growth. This 
incorrectly identified biomass growth could potentially make the coefficients skewed. From 
the data set we were able to identify when recruits are released by identifying the observations 
where the number of fish increased from one month to the next. Often, recruits are released 
over 2 to 3 months continuous, and they are usually part of the same generation, either spring 
or fall smolts. The conclusion after adjusting biomass for release, with an assumed weight per 
recruit, is that the adjustment introduces more uncertainty into the data set than it improves it, 






Each location reports the number of fish in the sea at the end of each month. The number of 
fish is most often an estimate, as it is challenging to know the exact number of fish in a cage. 
The estimation is based on continuous bookkeeping, where the stock is reduced in the event 
of harvest or death. More accurate counts are done when the fish are released, and thereafter 
in the event of treatment, or relocation of the fish (Høy et al., 2013). 
 
The variable fish per pen is defined as the average number of fish per active pen at a location, 
where an active pen is considered to be a pen with reported biomass above zero. The practice 
of moving fish between pens within a location is widespread, and the number of active pens 
may change during the period of a rotation. It is thus important to keep in mind that 
intermediate changes in the variable may occur due to changes in the number of active pens, 
and not necessarily due to changes in the fish stock. As with the variable for total number of 
fish per location, the variable for fish per pen is based on bookkept numbers or estimation of 






6. Empirical Framework 
We will in this chapter present the empirical growth and price model which is derived from 
the data set. In Section 6.1, we introduce the structural growth and price model, while Section 
6.2 and 6.3 are devoted to the discussion of potential challenges with multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. 
6.1 Structural Models 
6.1.1 Growth Model 
We have created a growth model for an individual fish’ weight, which enables the estimation 
of the willingness-to-pay for change in capacity. The model considers a fish’ weight as a 
function of time after release, and the functional form, as suggested by Asche and Bjørndal 
(2011), is a third-degree polynomial with interception set to zero and no first-degree 
component. We will in this section present and evaluate the following model: 
 
+Y* = 	eG	#]f'` + e`	#]f'g + eg	#]f'` ∗ 8Qhi_\Q'\ + ek	#]f'g ∗ 8Qhi_\Q'\ +
el		m]['Y* + en		i'op]# Ŷ* + q	fho#ℎ + s* + tY + uY*  
 
The dependent variable is the weight of an individual fish wit at a given fish farming location 
i and in a given year and month t, which is a function of the number of time periods time after 
the release of a generation and a set of control variables. The variable time is measured as the 
number of months after the release of a generation. We find and support that a third-degree 
polynomial with interception equal to zero is a good fit for the data. In reality, the interception 
would equal the size of the smolt in the period of smolt release, which we are not able to 
account for. We have included interaction terms between the second- and third-degree 
component of the time variable and production area, to obtain unique growth coefficients per 
production area. The variables liceit and densityit are included in the regression as control 
variables. Liceit is the average monthly number of lice per fish for a given location in a given 
month and densityit is the average number of fish per pen for a given location in a given month. 






Having the dependent variable in logarithmic form has been considered as an alternative 
functional form, where an increase in time represents a relative intermediate change in 
biomass. However, this model would yield a considerable overestimation of biomass when 
running post-regression analysis and a higher estimation error compared to having the 
dependent variable at level form.  
 
The model is estimated using dummy variables for month, which allows us to control for 
endogeneity related to month specific unobserved factors being correlated with the 
explanatory variables. In addition, including indicator variables for month removes any 
month-dependent variation in the dependent variable. These effects are given by the parameter 
d. By controlling for time and location fixed effects, we are able to control for endogeneity 
related to unobserved common macro effects that changes over time, as well as unobserved 
fixed effects between locations. 
 
An example of unobserved common macro effects are disease or climatic conditions that affect 
the growth conditions negatively for the whole industry, thus leading to a below-average 
growth rate for all fish farming locations in a given year. Location specific fixed effects may 
be caused by differences in individual efficiency of different fish farmers, or geographical 
climatic differences leading to heterogeneity in growth rate. By partial out the fixed effects, 
as well as the variation related to the control variables, we are able to utilize the residual 
variation in growth to isolate the true intermediate growth in biomass from one period to 
another on an average level represented by the estimated regression coefficients for the time 
variable. 
Assessing Potential Explanatory Variables 
We emphasize the fact that other unobserved factors, which are necessarily not correlated with 
the explanatory variables, should be included in a true growth model to be able to estimate the 
weight of an individual fish more accurately. As earlier presented, several factors are relevant 
to determine the growth rate of salmon, and variables such as daylight, salinity, density and 
diseases are known examples. However, we have not been successful in obtaining adequate 
data on these factors. 
 
We have data on temperature together with lice, PD and ILA in our data set. In addition, we 





One may argue that this variable is correlated with the density of fish in a pen. The relationship 
between the above-mentioned variables and the dependent variables can be assessed by 
drawing a plot showing binned scatterplots. Each point represents the mean of the x-axis and 
y-axis for 100 equal sized bins of the x-axis variable, which improves readability compared to 
an ordinary scatterplot. The red line is a linear fit between the two variables in the plot. The 
dependent variables are demeaned after controlling for month, as well as time and location 
fixed effects. The left-hand side plots illustrate the relationship between the variables with the 
dependent variables in level form, while the dependent variables are in logarithmic form in 
the right-hand side plots. 
 
Looking at the relationship between the dependent variable and the number of fish per pen, as 
shown in Figure 9, one can observe that it is negative correlated with a significant downward 
sloping trend. This is as expected, as higher density reduces the fish’ growth conditions 
negatively, which thus leads to relatively lower biomass at a given time period after release. 
One would expect the respective regression coefficient to be negative if the variable is 
included in the growth model. However, the plots also illustrate the fact that the fish is relative 
small when the number of fish is relatively large, which is at the point of release. The number 
of fish will be reduced due to mortality as the time increases, while the remaining fish grow 
in biomass. As we may not be certain if the variable explains the real effect of density on a 
fish’ individual weight, we choose to include the variable in the regression model only to 
control for the variation related to the amount of fish per pen, but we will not use the variable 
for post-regression weight estimations. 
 





The relationship between the dependent variable and the average number of lice per fish at a 
given location in a given time period is positive, as shown in Figure 10, thus expecting to yield 
a positive regression coefficient if the variable is to be included in the growth model. An 
increase in lice thus corresponds to an increase in weight in the data set, which is contradicting 
to our expectation of lice preventing biomass growth. For that reason, we choose only to 
include the variable as a control variable, and not use the variable for post-regression 
estimation. 
 
Figure 10 Scatterplot of weight per fish against lice  
One would expect, from a biological perspective, that the growth rate increases when the 
temperature increases up to a certain level, and we would expect to observe a relative higher 
weight per fish at relatively higher temperatures in the plots below. Although the red linear 
regression line indicates an upward sloping trend, we visually conclude that the relationship 
between the variables is ambiguous. The regression coefficient of temperature would be 







Figure 11 Scatterplot of weight per fish against temperature  
We have indicator variables for the diseases PD and ILA in our data set, indicating disease 
outbreak at a given fish farming location. Their respective regression coefficients, if included 
in the growth model, are positive, which is contradicting to our expectation of diseases, in 
general, affecting fish growth negatively. The variables are excluded from the model, as we 
have a lot of missing values for most production areas. 
 
One would expect that feed usage is a relevant explanatory variable in the growth model. 
However, including feed as an explanatory variable introduces a simultaneity problem in the 
regression and potentially biased coefficients caused by endogeneity, as feed usage is expected 
to explain a fish’s weight and growth, while weight and growth is also expected to explain the 
feed usage. We have not been successful in finding a good instrument for feed usage and thus 
concluded to exclude the variable from the regression model. 
 
As earlier described, controlling for month and location fixed effects is expected to remove 
month-dependent and geographic unobserved factors. It is well known that climatic factors, 
as temperature, daylight and salinity vary significant with month of the year and location. We 
are therefore confident that excluding the above-mentioned variables constitute a valid 
simplification of the true growth model, allowing us to estimate the intermediate change in 





6.1.2 Price Model 
The estimation of optimal rotation length according to the bioecological theory of Frank Asche 
and Trond Bjørndal (2011) requires an assumption of the price of salmon, which is suggested 
to be a function of weight. We have calculated our own empirical price function using 
historical price data in the period of 2005 to 2016 from the Nasdaq Salmon Index, which 
contains weekly reported exporters’ selling price for head on gutted salmon at different size 
intervals (Fishpool; Nasdaq). The prices are adjusted for inflation with 2015 as the reference 
year. Looking at the binned scatterplot below of the relationship between prices per kilogram 
and weight, we can observe that a quadradic function seems to be a reasonable fit to the data. 
 






The price function thus takes the following form: 
 
8(+) = eG + e`	+ + eg	+` + q	fho#ℎ + s	^'\Q + u 
 
We have that price per kilogram p(w) is a linear function of the first- and second-degree 
component of weight w, with the constant term b1. We choose to control for month represented 
by the parameter d, as it is shown that relative prices between different weight classes follow 
different month-dependent price patterns (Asche, 2002). We also control for time fixed effects 
represented by the parameter l. The parameter e is the error term. 
6.2 Multicollinearity 
Potential multicollinearity can be assessed by looking at the correlation between the 
explanatory variables, which is illustrated in the correlation matrix below. We can observe a 
significant high correlation between the second- and third-degree component of the time 
variable, while little correlation between the other variables. We are confident that 
multicollinearity does not bias the estimated standard deviations of the time variables, as they 
are correlated by construction. 
Table 4 Correlation Matrix 
 Time2 Time3 Lice Fish per pen Month Year 
Time2 1      
Time3 0.972*** 1     
Lice 0.249*** 0.216*** 1    
Fish per pen -0.215*** -0.208*** -0.117*** 1   
Month -0.0496*** -0.0270*** 0.0431*** -0.0215** 1  
Year -0.00824 -0.0207** -0.0387*** 0.0365*** -0.0565*** 1 





6.3 Adjusting for Heteroscedasticity and Serial Correlation 
It is reason to expect the existence of both heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the 
regression model, which can potentially bias the standard deviations and making model 
inference invalid. Heteroscedasticity is present if the variation in the error terms is not 
constant, thus violating the multiple regression assumption of homoscedastic error terms. 
Serial correlation is present if an error term in one period is correlated with the error term in 
another period, which will violate the multiple regression assumption of independent error 
terms errors (Hill et al., 2012). To assure unbiased standard deviations in the regression model, 
we choose to report Newey-West standard deviations which are robust to both 






7. Model Evaluation 
We will in this chapter present and evaluate our growth and price model based on the 
significance level of the regression coefficients, the model’s overall goodness-of-fit and 
prediction errors. We add control variables, time and location fixed effects stepwise in the 
models to investigate the respective effects. Finally, in Section 7.2, we comment on the 
validity of using the models for analytical purposes. We note that for simplicity, we evaluate 
the growth model for the industry as a whole by excluding the interaction terms between the 
time variables and production area when estimating the regression coefficients. 
7.1 Regression Results 
7.1.1 Growth Model 
The regression results for the structural growth model are presented in Table 5. All regression 
coefficients are significant at the 99 % level, with the coefficient for the second-degree 
component of time being positive and the coefficient for the third-degree component of time 
being negative. The direction of the coefficients is as expected, considering a concave growth 
function as time increases after a given cuspidal point. This means that the weight per fish will 
decline when the third-degree component becomes sufficiently large, which is not realistic. In 
reality, the fish will grow asymptotically towards its maximum weight. We wish to highlight 
that the size of the coefficients is challenging to interpret without running weight estimations 
in a spreadsheet.  
The first regression considers weight per fish as a function of time without control variables, 
month and year dummies, as well as location fixed effects. The goodness-of-fit for the first 
regression is considered to be good with an adjusted R-squared of 0.78. We observe that the 
explanatory power increases significantly when adding control variables in the second 
regression. Regression (1) and (2) yield higher coefficients for the time variable in absolute 
term compared to the regressions with month and year dummies in regression (3) and (4). 
Including month and year fixed effects increases the goodness-of-fit to 0.85. Compared to 
regression (3) and (4), we observe that the size of the coefficients for the time variable 





a decrease in goodness-of-fit to 0.77. The direction of the control variables is as discussed in 
Chapter 6, except from the positive direction of the coefficient of fish per pen in regression 
(2). We conclude that the main effects of the regressions, represented by the coefficients of 
the time variables, are highly significant and very robust. The conclusion is supported by a 
high explanatory power of all of the regressions. 
Table 5 Main Regressions of Growth Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Time2 0.0275*** 0.0226*** 0.0183*** 0.0182*** 0.0206*** 
 (0.000349) (0.000480) (0.000626) (0.000637) (0.000598) 
      
Time3 -0.000885*** -0.000653*** -0.000465*** -0.000458*** -0.000529*** 
 (0.0000213) (0.0000274) (0.0000354) (0.0000362) (0.0000364) 
      
Number of grown 
female lice 
 0.824*** 0.666*** 0.666*** 0.333*** 
 (0.0679) (0.0585) (0.0583) (0.0372) 
      
Number of fish per 
pen 
 0.00000133*** -0.00000272*** -0.00000276*** -0.00000524*** 
 (0.000000119) (0.000000311) (0.000000310) (0.000000508) 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No Yes Yes 
Location FE No No No No Yes 
N 45314 20811 20811 20811 20805 
Adj. R-sq. 0.78 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.77 






7.1.2 Price Model 
The regression results for the quadratic price model are presented in Table 6, with a stepwise 
inclusion of year and month fixed effects. 
Table 6 Main Regressions of Price Model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Weight 5.557*** 5.557*** 5.557*** 
 (0.344) (0.201) (0.192) 
    
Weight^2 -0.489*** -0.489*** -0.489*** 
 (0.0447) (0.0253) (0.0241) 
    
Constant 23.48*** 16.44*** 15.00*** 
 (0.535) (0.367) (0.489) 
Year FE No Yes Yes 
Month FE No No Yes 
N 4382 4382 4382 
Adj. R-sq. 0.11 0.73 0.76 
Standard errors in parentheses. Month and year dummies not reported. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
The constant and the coefficients of the first-degree component of weight is, as expected, both 
positive and significant at the 99 %-level, while the second-degree component of weight is 
negative and also highly significant. The first regression yields an adjusted R-squared of 0.11, 
with a significantly increase in adjusted R-squared when adding year and month fixed effects. 
The inclusion of the fixed effects decreases the interception, while the coefficients of weight 
remain unchanged. We can observe a slightly increase in explanatory power when adding 
month fixed effects in regression (3) compared to regression (2). We conclude that the 
quadratic price model explains the relationship between price per kilogram and weight quite 





7.2 Model Validation 
7.2.1 Growth Model 
To further validate our growth model, we run post-regression predictions of weight per fish 
using all five regressions and calculate their respective prediction errors. We use observations 
from year 2005 to 2014 to estimate the regression coefficients and observations from year 
2015 and 2016 to make weight predictions. The predictions are estimated using only the 
parameters of the time variable, not taking into account control variables and fixed effects. 
The mean absolute error, abbreviated MAE, and mean absolute percentage error, abbreviated 
MAPE, for all five regressions are presented in the table below. 
Table 7 Prediction Errors of the Growth Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
MAE 0.522 0.552 0.636 0.635 0.556 
MAPE 40.10 39.44 42.54 42.52 39.72 
The first regression has the lowest value of MAE compared to the other regressions, while the 
second regression has the lowest value of MAPE. The mean absolute error implies that the 
average absolute error in weight estimation is between 0.522 and 0.636 kilogram, while the 
mean absolute percentage error implies that the weight predictions deviate with 39.44 % to 
42.54 % from the real observed value. The error measures do not indicate whether the 
deviation is due to over- or underestimation. 
 
We plot the predicted values against the observed values to investigate if the errors are due to 
over- or underestimation. The binned scatterplot below would align along the diagonal line if 
the predicted values were equal to the observed values. We can observe from the plot that the 
weight predictions from all five regressions are slightly underpredicted, with the first 






Figure 13 Prediction plot of the growth model 
The magnitude of the prediction errors is satisfying taking into consideration that we are 
predicting an average fish’ weight at a given time period after release in a highly 
heterogeneous industry. It is thus expected that each weight observation deviate from the mean 
to a certain degree. As the predictions are consistently underpredicted, we may be confident 
that this leads to a relatively lower biomass estimation, which in turn leads to underestimated 
economic effects of the Production Area Regulation.  
 
We would expect the fifth regression to be the most accurate, but we note that the model’s 
adjusted R-squared is smaller compared the other regressions. Although regression (2) yields 
better model fit in terms of predictions errors compared to regression (5), we conclude that the 
difference in predictions errors between the regressions, both numeric and visually, is small, 
making the five regression results quite similar. We may then be confident in using the fifth 
regression for analytical purposes, as including month, year and location fixed effects are 





7.2.2 Price Model 
The prediction errors of the price model are displayed in Table 8. We do not find it relevant to 
divide the data set into a separate estimation and prediction part, as the price level has been 
considerably higher towards to end of the data period. Making out-of-sample predictions in 
this case would lead to an underprediction of price. Similar to the evaluation of the growth 
model, we use only the parameters of the weight variable to make the predictions. 
Table 8 Prediction Errors of the Price Model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
MAE 8.087 8.952 9.647 
MAPE 23.18 21.60 23.07 
The first regression has the lowest value of MAE, while the second regression has the lowest 
value of MAPE. We find the regression errors, in general, to be adequate. Whether the errors 
are due to over- or underprediction is illustrated in Figure 14. 
 





We can observe from the plot that the predictions are underpredicted for the second and third 
regression, while the first regression has the visually best fit. The inclusion of month and year 
fixed effects is expected to yield more valid regression results and we thus choose to use the 
third regression for analytical purposes. It is important to note that the underprediction of price 








In this chapter, we will estimate rotation length, weight per fish at harvest, willingness-to-pay 
and profit for changes in capacity constraint per license in each production area. In Section 
8.1, we present the initial model setup and introduce the relevant parameters. In Section 8.2, 
optimal production without capacity constraints is estimated, before capacity constraints are 
implemented in Sections 8.3 and 8.4. The model is further developed to take into account 
fallowing in Section 8.5. The regulative status of the production areas and the implications for 
profits is discussed in Section 8.6. Heterogeneity in the economic effects is discussed in 
Section 8.7, where changes are made to the initial assumptions regarding number of recruits, 
mortality rate, price, costs and interest rate. In Section 8.8, the model is updated to reflect a 
more recent price and cost level in the industry, before we move on to a more general 
discussion of our findings. Lastly, the limitations of the analysis are discussed.  
8.1 Initial Model Setup 
8.1.1 Willingness-To-Pay 
The objective of the analysis is to estimate optimal rotation length as proposed in the 








The willingness-to-pay expresses how much companies in the industry should be willing to 
pay per kilo for increased capacity, or alternatively to avoid capacity reduction.  
8.1.2 The Profit Function 











When examining the functional form of the profit function, as seen in Figure 15, for the 
production areas displayed in Figure 7, it becomes evident that the return on increased capacity 
is declining after a given cuspidal point as farmers approach optimal production, indicating 
diminishing returns on capacity increase on the concave part of the curve. We thus understand 
that the willingness-to-pay is highly dependent on the deviation from optimal harvesting time. 
 
Figure 15 Present value over time of infinite rotations for all production areas, numbers in million NOK   
8.1.3 MAB Constraints 
The model maximizes the profit per production license by changing the rotation length, under 
the constraint that total biomass cannot be higher than MAB at any time, as expressed in 
equation (16). For production areas 1 to 9, the initial license MAB is set to 780 ton, while the 
MAB is set to 945 ton for production areas 10 to 13. We further assume that the license 
capacity is fully utilized at all times. Full capacity utilization implies that a new rotation is 
started immediately after a rotation has ended. We further assume that in the cases where both 
location MAB and license MAB are binding restrictions, the increase in license MAB is 
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In the analysis, a change in MAB is operationalized through a change in rotation length, and 
not through changes in the number of recruits. This simplification is not necessarily an 
unrealistic delimitation, as it is reasonable to assume that farmers release as much smolt as 
possible, both from a regulatory perspective and according to the supply of smolt.   
8.1.4 Growth Function, Mortality Rate and Number of Recruits 
The growth function is derived for each production area as described in Chapter 6, and is 
expressed as:  
+Y* = 	eG	#]f'` + e`	#]f'g 
 
The coefficients of the growth function for each production area are estimated and displayed 
in the table below. Mortality is assumed to be constant over time and is derived from the data 
set. The number of recruits per license is calculated based on release data from the Directorate 
of Fisheries (Fiskeridirektoratet). 
Table 9 Model Parameter Values per Production Area 
Area Time2 Time3 Mortality Rate Recruits per license 
1 0.0117 0.0001 0.0114 375 593 
2 0.0065 -0.0004 0.0131 375 593 
3 0.0111 -0.0006 0.0110 251 964 
4 0.0107 -0.0006 0.0103 271 895 
5 0.0102 -0.0006 0.0094 386 142 
6 0.0076 -0.0006 0.0112 294 997 
7 0.0087 -0.0006 0.0081 203 852 
8 0.0049 -0.0004 0.0095 380 873 
9 0.0028 -0.0003 0.0082 380 873 
10 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0085 373 548 
11 0.0006 -0.0003 0.0100 373 548 
12 0.0032 -0.0005 0.0131 268 589 





To illustrate the growth model coefficients, the growth of a representative fish in each 
production area is illustrated in the figure below. 
 
Figure 16 Growth function for each production area 
From Figure 16 it becomes clear that the growth functions are highly heterogeneous across the 
production areas. It is worth noticing that production area 1 has a convex growth function for 
all values of time, and that it predicts unrealistically large fish as time increases. It does, 
however, yield valid results within reasonable intervals of the time variable. 
8.1.5 Price Function 
Furthermore, the price function derived from the data set is, as described in Chapter 6, 
expressed as: 
 
8(+) = eG + e`	+ + eg	+` 
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8.1.6 Interest Rate and Costs 
The interest rate is set to 6 % to reflect expected return on investments in the Norwegian 
market (Kinserdal, 2017; PwC, 2016a). 
 
We further assume a production cost per kilo of 22 NOK, which is the average production cost 
from 2008 until 2016 (Fiskeridirektoratet, 2017b). To simplify the analysis, the production 
cost is assumed to be constant over the whole production cycle. The cost term is incorporated 
into the model as illustrated in equation (13). Note that we do not take into account a potential 
change in cost due to changes in MAB in the analysis, such as an increase in cost of capital 
due to necessary investments in production equipment. 
 
A summary of the initial setup parameters is shown in Table 10. 
Table 10: Summary of Model Parameters 
Growth function Derived from the data set for each production area 
Price function Derived from the data set 
Mortality Average mortality rate per production area 
Recruits Average number of recruits per license per production area 
Interest rate 6 % p.a. 
MAB 780 ton in production area 1 to 9 
945 ton in production area 10 to 13 
Capacity increase 2 % 
Capacity decrease 6 % 
Production costs  22 NOK/kg 
8.2 No Capacity Constraints 
As a benchmark result for later analysis, optimal rotation length, weight per fish at harvest and 
total profit over infinite rotations with the given parameters and without capacity constraints, 






Table 11  Results Without Capacity Constraint 
Area Rotation length Weight per fish Profits 
1 21.28 6.24 145 726 412 
2 22.58 5.71 120 574 252 
3 21.34 5.09 79 878 707 
4 21.56 5.26 90 028 856 
5 21.82 5.36 131 508 881 
6 22.71 4.57 73 140 474 
7 22.22 4.45 53 465 650 
8 24.56 5.54 115 548 232 
9 25.70 5.74 116 735 104 
10 27.29 5.86 107 163 251 
11 28.57 4.89 78 188 148 
12 23.67 3.54 37 401 805 
13 23.96 3.65 38 181 614 
We can observe from the table that average rotation length is 23.64 months with an average 
expected profit of 91 349 337. Good growth conditions in production area 1 corresponds to 
the highest expected value of future biomass, while the northernmost areas can expect a 
considerably lower profit. This is both a result of different growth conditions, as well as 
different number of recruits. 
8.3 Introducing Current MAB Constraints 
In this section, we introduce the MAB constraints to the model. The estimation of rotation 
length, weight per fish at harvest and total profits over an infinite number of rotations are 
shown in Table 12. The numbers displayed in parenthesis are percentage change compared to 






Table 12 Results from Introduction of Current Capacity Constraints 
Area Rotation length Weight per fish Profits 
1 13.63 (-35.93 %) 2.42 (-61.18 %) 40 915 923 (-71.92 %) 
2 13.24 (-41.39 %) 2.47 (-56.71 %) 43 847 541 (-63.63 %) 
3 16.31 (-23.58 %) 3.70 (-27.26 %) 64 870 249 (-18.79 %) 
4 15.15 (-29.74 %) 3.35 (-36.24 %) 62 513 973 (-30.56 %) 
5 11.83 (-45.78 %) 2.26 (-57.90 %) 40 160 956 (-69.46 %) 
6 16.45 (-27.56 %) 3.18 (-30.40 %) 53 595 184 (-26.72 %) 
7 22.22 (0.00 %) 4.45 (0.00 %) 53 465 650 (0.00 %) 
8 13.67 (-44.36 %) 2.33 (-57.93 %) 37 391 363 (-67.64 %) 
9 14.28 (-44.44 %) 2.30 (-59.90 %) 34 716 766 (-70.26 %) 
10 17.76 (-34.93 %) 2.94 (-49.79 %) 53 522 452 (-50.06 %) 
11 19.62 (-31.32 %) 3.08 (-37.14 %) 51 540 719 (-34.08 %) 
12 23.67 (0.00 %) 3.54 (0.00 %) 37 401 805 (0.00 %) 
13 23.96 (0.00 %) 3.65 (0.00 %) 38 181 614 (0.00 %) 
Comparing Table 11 and Table 12, it becomes evident that rotation length decreases 
substantially when capacity constraints are introduced for all production areas where the 
capacity constraint is binding, i.e. the farmers are forced to harvest the fish earlier than what 
is optimal due to the MAB constraints. In production area 7, 12 and 13, the capacity constraint 
is not binding, and rotation length thus remains unchanged. On average, the rotation length 
when introducing the MAB constraints is reduced by 27 %, which equals a 6.5 months 
reduction, with production area 5 experiencing the relatively largest reduction in rotation 
length of more than 45 %. Weight per fish at harvest is correspondingly reduced as a result of 
decreased time in the sea. On average, the fish are harvested 2.02 kg before optimal, which 
translates to a weight reduction of 36.5 % when introducing capacity constraints.    
8.4 Introducing 2 % Increase in MAB Constraint 
A 2 % increase in MAB is further introduced, which illustrates a scenario where all production 





displayed in Table 13, including changes in rotation length, weight per fish at harvest and 
profits compared to the previous scenario displayed in Table 12. We note that willingness-to-
pay is abbreviated WTP in this table, and in all other tables in this chapter. 
Table 13 Results from Increased Capacity Constraints of 2 %  
Area WTP Rotation length Weight per fish Profits 
1 146.32 13.77 (1.02 %) 2.48 (2.16 %) 43 198 460 (5.58 %) 
2 147.90 13.41 (1.30 %) 2.52 (2.23 %) 46 154 710 (5.26 %) 
3 107.57 16.58 (1.70 %) 3.79 (2.31 %) 66 548 394 (2.59 %) 
4 126.80 15.38 (1.53 %) 3.43 (2.24 %) 64 492 045 (3.16 %) 
5 153.58 11.99 (1.30 %) 2.31 (2.15 %) 42 556 786 (5.97 %) 
6 114.02 16.73 (1.73 %) 3.25 (2.33 %) 55 373 863 (3.32 %) 
7 0.00 22.22 (0.00 %) 4.45 (0.00 %) 53 465 650 (0.00 %) 
8 136.02 13.84 (1.30 %) 2.38 (2.17 %) 39 513 349 (5.68 %) 
9 129.06 14.46 (1.25 %) 2.35 (2.15 %) 36 730 083 (5.80 %) 
10 113.86 17.99 (1.28 %) 3.01 (2.20 %) 55 674 423 (4.02 %) 
11 98.40 19.94 (1.60 %) 3.15 (2.32 %) 53 400 460 (3.61 %) 
12 0.00 23.67 (0.00 %) 3.54 (0.00 %) 37 401 805 (0.00 %) 
13 0.00 23.96 (0.00 %) 3.65 (0.00 %) 38 181 614 (0.00 %) 
It becomes evident when comparing Table 12 and Table 13 that the increased MAB increases 
rotation length for all production areas where the capacity constraint is binding. For production 
area 7, 12 and 13, where the current MAB constraint is non-binding, the capacity increase of 
2 % does not change the result of the model, as farmers in these areas are not able to utilize 
the existing capacity fully. 
 
On average, the rotation length increases by 1.08 %, translating to 5 extra days in the sea and 
an average weight increase of 5 gram per fish. The total profits over an infinite number of 
rotations is on average increased by 3.46 % per license, all else equal. It is important to 
emphasize the heterogeneity of the results, where the change in profits resulting from the 






It is worth noticing that the average willingness-to-pay is 99.10 NOK/kg and that this is lower 
than the price for capacity increase, which is set to 120 NOK/kg. The commercial aspect of 
buying growth will be further discussed in Section 8.6. 
8.5 Introducing Fallowing 
The model is further modified to account for two months fallowing at the end of a rotation by 
using the profit function displayed in equation (22): 
 




The results from this modification are showed in Table 14, with changes from Table 13 
displayed in parenthesis. 
Table 14 Results When Introducing 2 Months Fallowing 
Area WTP Rotation length Weight per fish Profits 
1 130.08 (-11.10 %) 13.77 (0.00 %) 2.48 (0.00 %) 37 534 288 (-13.11 %) 
2 132.17 (-10.63 %) 13.41 (0.00 %) 2.52 (0.00 %) 39 967 013 (-13.41 %) 
3 102.28 (-4.92 %) 16.58 (0.00 %) 3.79 (0.00 %) 59 094 364 (-11.20 %) 
4 117.86 (-7.05 %) 15.38 (0.00 %) 3.43 (0.00 %) 56 791 362 (-11.94 %) 
5 135.05 (-12.06 %) 11.99 (0.00 %) 3.43 (48.66 %) 36 291 894 (-14.72 %) 
6 106.95 (-6.20 %) 16.73 (0.00 %) 3.25 (0.00 %) 49 218 422 (-11.12 %) 
7 0.00 (0.00 %) 22.51 (1.32 %) 4.50 (0.95 %) 48 834 069 (-8.66 %) 
8 121.67 (-10.55 %) 13.84 (0.00 %) 2.38 (0.00 %) 34 355 809 (-13.05 %) 
9 115.77 (-10.30 %) 14.46 (0.00 %) 2.35 (0.00 %) 32 108 591 (-12.58 %) 
10 105.22 (-7.59 %) 17.99 (0.00 %) 3.01 (0.00 %) 49 856 617 (-10.45 %) 
11 92.58 (-5.91 %) 19.94 (0.00 %) 3.15 (0.00 %) 48 292 685 (-9.57 %) 
12 0.00 (0.00 %) 23.90 (0.96 %) 3.56 (0.60 %) 34 329 695 (-8.21 %) 
13 0.00 (0.00 %) 24.20 (0.99 %) 3.67 (0.65 %) 35 078 864 (-8.13 %) 
The fact that willingness-to-pay is reduced when introducing fallow periods becomes evident 





% as a result of reduced present value of increased capacity, resulting in an average reduction 
in profit of 11.24 %. Rotation length and weight per fish at harvest remains unchanged in all 
areas where the capacity constraint is binding. For the production areas where capacity is non-
binding, the willingness-to-pay remains 0, while rotation length and weight per fish at harvest 
increase. This is due to the reduced value of future rotations, and thus a reduced opportunity 
cost of keeping the fish in the sea for a longer period.  
 
An increase in discount period reduces the present value of future profit, and the corresponding 
reduction in willingness-to-pay reflects that increased capacity is worth less when full capacity 
utilization is not possible due to fallowing. Using this line of argument, it is worth reflecting 
upon the fact that capacity utilization in the industry varies, and that larger firms enjoy larger 
flexibility than smaller ones, as a result of a large volume of licenses and locations. The large 
firms can therefore, in theory, to a larger degree plan and optimize production so that capacity 
is utilized to a maximum extent at all times, e.g. by operating locations with alternating fallow 
periods. On the other hand, complex production systems and logistics management, together 
with decreased ownership when a company becomes large may lead to reduced capacity 
utilization. The industry participants that manage to optimize production so that capacity is 
fully utilized at all times have the highest profit from buying growth, and thus the regulation 
awards the efficient firms through the use of homogenous prices. 
 
To sum up the findings so far; the rotation length is drastically reduced when introducing 
capacity constraints, and on average Norwegian fish farmers harvest 27 % before optimal, 
which translates to over 6 months. The introduction of capacity constraints does not change 
rotation length in production area 7, 12 and 13, as the MAB constraint never becomes binding. 
The average willingness-to-pay for 2 % capacity increase is 99.10 NOK/kg assuming that all 
areas are classified as green, with variations from zero to 153.58. The rotation length is 
increased by 1.08 % in this scenario and profits are increased by 3.64 % per license. The 
introduction of fallowing reduces the willingness-to-pay, as restricted use of the production 





8.6 Evaluation of the Current Status 
In the previous sections, all areas where assumed to have a green status to illustrate the 
different areas’ willingness-to-pay for capacity increase. Now, we evaluate the net effect per 
license of the Production Area Regulation based on the current color of each area. The 
calculation is based on the model without fallowing. 
Table 15 displays the average net effect per license of each area. As illustrated in Figure 7 in 
Chapter 3, area 1 and 7 to 13 have been classified as green, 3 and 4 as red and 2, 5 and 6 as 
yellow. The net effect for the green areas is calculated as the economic gain of increasing 
capacity by 2 % subtracted the price for capacity increase of 120 NOK/kg. The net effect for 
the red areas is the economic loss of an imposed capacity reduction of 6 %, while the net effect 
for yellow areas is equal to zero due to no changes in capacity. 
Table 15 Total Effect of the Production Area Regulation 
Area WTP Change in profits Net effect 
1 146.32 2 282 536 410 536 
2 147.90 0 0 
3 116.41 -5 448 147 -5 448 147 
4 132.78 -6 214 179 -6 214 179 
5 153.58 0 0 
6 114.02 0 0 
7 0.00 0 -1 872 000 
8 136.02 2 121 986 249 986 
9 129.06 2 013 317 141 317 
10 113.86 2 151 970 -116 030 
11 98.40 1 859 741 -408 259 
12 0.00 0 -2 268 000 
13 0.00 0 -2 268 000 
From the table it becomes evident that the red production areas incur a loss in profits, while 





over number of licenses per area, not taking into account the price of growth, The Production 
Area Regulation leads to change in profits of -829 883 per license over infinite rotations. The 
green areas gain an average of 1 334 044, while the red areas lose 5 865 679. The calculation 
assumes 2 % growth in green areas and 6 % reduction in red. If one assumes that the additional 
4 % increase will be bought by existing license owners and that the additional increase does 
not lead to increased costs, the total change in profits resulting from the regulation is 410 486 
on average. The green areas then gain 3 979 908 per license over infinite rotations.  
Further, examining the net effect in Table 15, the results imply that within the green areas the 
investment in increased capacity is only profitable, on average, for fish farming companies 
with licenses located in production areas 1, 8 and 9. The remaining green areas have a negative 
net effect from buying growth, as the price of capacity increase is higher than their willingness-
to-pay. In areas 7, 12 and 13 the capacity constraint is non-binding, resulting in a willingness-
to-pay equal to zero. This implies that their capacity utilization should be increased on existing 
capacity before they apply for additional growth. Buying growth in these areas results in a 
negative net effect equal to the price paid for the capacity increase. Even so, we witness a high 
demand for capacity increase today, as applications for growth has been received on a total of 
449 out of 461 licenses in the green areas. 
Why farmers in green areas choose to buy increased capacity when our analysis suggests that 
it is not profitable may be explained by several factors. One explanation is that farmers have 
different assumptions when evaluating the profitability of capacity increase. Higher prices, 
lower cost levels and better growth conditions are some of the factors that could potentially 
increase the willingness-to-pay. Another explanation may be that farmers are risk averse, and 
that certain growth today is better than uncertain growth in the future. The Production Area 
Regulation opens for future changes in the environmental factors that constitute the criteria 
for growth over time, meaning that licenses that qualify for growth today may not qualify for 
growth tomorrow. A third explanation may be that the increased capacity will be 
operationalized in a different production area, as large companies are able to realize the growth 
through sophisticated production planning and the use of interregional biomass limits. This is 
not accounted for in our model. One last explanation may be that the price for capacity increase 
is below the perceived market value of capacity, meaning that buying capacity increase is 






Production area 3 and 4 have been given a red status, and we can observe from the table that 
the corresponding economic loss of the imposed capacity reduction of 6 % is considerably 
large without any reversal in the long run. In addition to lost revenue due to reduced biomass, 
one should take into account the occurring costs of increased lice treatment and a potential 
depreciation in the valuation of the companies when assessing the total effects of the imposed 
capacity reduction. It is worth noticing that both production areas have a high potential gain 
of capacity increase if the areas were to be given a green status in the future, and that fish 
farmers in these areas have a relatively high willingness-to-pay to avoid capacity reduction by 
reducing the infestation pressure of lice, and thus become classified as yellow or green in the 
future. 
 
Production area 2, 5 and 6 have been given a yellow status, which imply neither a potential 
capacity increase nor an imposed capacity decrease. From Table 13 we know that area 2 and 
5 have a willingness-to-pay above the price for capacity increase, and the areas are thus 
incentivized to reduce the infestation pressure of lice.  
 
The changes in capacity imposed by the Production Area Regulation combined with the price 
of growth results in a weighted average net effect per license of -1 789 175. Production area 1 
has the largest potential gain from the regulative regime with an increase in profits over infinite 
rotations of 410 536, while production area 4 incur the greatest loss of -6 214 179. It is 
important to emphasize that the assumptions underlying the model influences the magnitude 
of the results to a large degree. Still, the fact that the economic effects imposed by the 
Production Area Regulation are highly heterogeneous becomes evident.  
8.7 Heterogeneity in the Economic Effects 
We observe from our results in the previous section that the economic effects of the Production 
Area Regulation are highly heterogeneous between production areas. We will in this section 
discuss the assumptions underlying the analysis and illustrate how changes in the respective 
parameters affect the results. The results from these scenarios are compared to the results 





8.7.1 Changes in Biomass 
From equation (3) it is evident that total biomass is a function of two elements; the number of 
fish and the weight per fish. In our model, this means that the willingness-to-pay for each 
production area is a result of number of recruits per license per year, mortality rate and the 
growth function for each area. We will in this subsection analyze how changes in the number 
of recruits and mortality rate changes the willingness-to-pay for capacity increase. Changes in 
the number of recruits change the interception, while a change in mortality rate translates to a 
change in the slope of the curve resulting from equation (3). 
Changes in Number of Recruits 
Looking at Table 13, we see that in production areas where a large number of recruits are 
released, the willingness-to-pay is higher than in areas with a smaller number of recruits. To 
illustrate; production area 5 has the largest number of recruits and the highest willingness-to-
pay for capacity increase. In this area, the capacity constraint becomes binding as early as after 
12 months, and a representative farmer in this area thus harvests 10 months before optimal. 
Production area 7, on the other hand, has the lowest number of recruits, and the willingness-
to-pay for capacity increase is equal to zero due to non-binding capacity constraint. Farmers 
in production area 7 thus harvest at their optimal harvesting time. 
 
If one sets an equal number of recruits for all production areas, isolation of the magnitude of 
growth coefficients on willingness-to-pay becomes feasible. The number of recruits is in this 
scenario set to the industry average of 323 543. The results are displayed in Table 16. When 
comparing Table 13 and Table 16, it becomes evident that for production area 5, this results 
in a reduction in number of recruits by 16.21 %, a reduction of willingness-to-pay by 4.45 % 
and an increase in rotation length by 12.65 %. For production area 7, the number of recruits is 
increased by 58.71 %, resulting in an increase in willingness-to-pay to 130 NOK/kg and a 






Table 16 Results with Number of Recruits set to 323 543  
Area % ∆ R WTP Rotation length Profits 
1 -13.86 % 145.76 (-0.38 %) 14.87 (7.98 %) 53 359 775 (23.52 %) 
2 -13.86 % 140.53 (-4.98 %) 14.81 (10.47 %) 55 663 799 (20.60 %) 
3 28.41 % 145.97 (35.69 %) 13.62 (-17.86 %) 56 635 179 (-14.90 %) 
4 19.00 % 147.01 (15.94 %) 13.53 (-12.04 %) 56 090 766 (-13.03 %) 
5 -16.21 % 146.74 (-4.45 %) 13.50 (12.65 %) 55 066 403 (29.40 %) 
6 9.68 % 126.46 (10.91 %) 15.49 (-7.44 %) 51 553 967 (-6.90 %) 
7 58.71 % 130.00 - 14.66 (-34.03 %) 49 874 856 (-6.72 %) 
8 -15.05 % 129.96 (-4.46 %) 15.44 (11.51 %) 49 513 447 (25.31 %) 
9 -15.05 % 124.73 (-3.35 %) 16.05 (11.01 %) 46 423 888 (26.39 %) 
10 -13.39 % 102.23 (-10.21 %) 19.77 (9.89 %) 62 115 038 (11.57 %) 
11 -13.39 % 77.83 (-20.90 %) 22.55 (13.08 %) 57 531 931 (7.74 %) 
12 20.46 % 0.00 (0.00 %) 23.67 (0.00 %) 45 054 267 (20.46 %) 
13 20.46 % 0.00 (0.00 %) 23.96 (0.00 %) 45 993 626 (20.46 %) 
From the table, we observe that for the areas with binding capacity constraint, the profit 
increases when the number of recruits is reduced and decreases for areas where the number of 
recruits is increased. This might seem somewhat contradictory, but the increased rotation 
length thus outweighs the effect of the reduced number of fish as a result of increased weight 
and a corresponding realization of higher prices. 
The change in willingness-to-pay is influenced by whether the farmer is further away from, or 
closer to optimal rotation length, after the number of recruits is changed. In the areas where 
the number of recruits is reduced and thus the rotation length is increased, the willingness-to-
pay for growth decreases. An example of one such area is area 11, where the rotation length 
is increased by 13.08 % and the willingness-to-pay is reduced by 20.90 %. On the contrary, 
the willingness-to-pay is increased in the areas where the rotation length is reduced due to 
increased number of recruits. This illustrates the functional form of the production function as 






This scenario also illustrates that in areas with relatively high growth rates, e.g. area 1 and 2, 
the willingness-to-pay is higher compared to areas with relatively low growth rates, such as 
area 11 and 12.  This seems intuitive, as farmers in areas with good growth rates will risk 
hitting their MAB earlier than farmers in other areas. This further implies that willingness-to-
pay for capacity increase should be influenced by whether the farmer releases spring or fall 
smolts. One may argue that the willingness-to-pay for capacity increase should be higher for 
farms with spring generations compared to farms with fall generations due to better growth 
conditions. 
Changes in mortality rate  
An increase in mortality rate results in a reduced number of fish, and thus a reduction in total 
biomass, while the opposite is true for a decrease in mortality rate. A reduction in biomass 
further implies a reduction in present value of future rotations, everything else held equal. To 
illustrate, an increase in mortality rate by 10 % and keeping the rotation length fixed in 
production area 1, results in a decrease in profit. This scenario is displayed in Table 17.  
Table 17 Increase of 10 % in Mortality with Fixed Rotation Length 
Area WTP Rotation length Weight per fish Profits 
1 146.32 13.77 (0.00 %) 2.48 (0. 00 %) 42 528 065 (-1.55 %) 
If rotation length is not held fixed on the other hand, we find that increased mortality rate 
results in better production optimization for all areas where the capacity constraint is binding 
due to increased rotation length for the fish that survive. The increased mortality is thus 
outweighed by better prices for the larger fish that live until harvest. These results are 






Table 18 Increase of 10 % in Mortality 
Area WTP Rotation length Weight per fish Profits 
1 147.26 (0.65 %) 13.88 (0.81 %) 2.52 (1.73 %) 44 346 417 (2.66 %) 
2 148.45 (0.37 %) 13.57 (1.17 %) 2.58 (2.01 %) 47 406 277 (2.71 %) 
3 103.39 (-3.88 %) 16.85 (1.62 %) 3.87 (2.17 %) 66 828 671 (0.42 %) 
4 124.70 (-1.65 %) 15.58 (1.25 %) 3.49 (1.82 %) 65 032 981 (0.84 %) 
5 154.17 (0.38 %) 12.08 (0.75 %) 2.33 (1.24 %) 43 452 460 (2.10 %) 
6 111.47 (-2.23 %) 17.02 (1.70 %) 3.33 (2.26 %) 55 992 773 (1.12 %) 
7 0.00 (0. 00 %) 22.15 (-0.29 %) 4.44 (-0.22 %) 52 515 466 (-1.78 %) 
8 136.54 (0.38 %) 13.96 (0.87 %) 2.42 (1.46 %) 40 414 240 (2.28 %) 
9 129.58 (0.40 %) 14.57 (0.76 %) 2.38 (1.31 %) 37 513 827 (2.13 %) 
10 113.50 (-0.32 %) 18.17 (1.00 %) 3.06 (1.72 %) 56 486 142 (1.46 %) 
11 96.87 (-1.55 %) 20.27 (1.65 %) 3.22 (2.38 %) 54 186 796 (1.47 %) 
12 0.00 (0. 00 %) 23.58 (-0.38 %) 3.53 (-0.25 %) 36 263 659 (-3.04 %) 
13 0.00 (0.00 %) 23.86 (-0.44 %) 3.64 (-0.30 %) 36 913 914 (-3.32 %) 
In production areas where the introduction of capacity constraints leads to a relatively large 
reduction in rotation length, i.e. areas which are far away from their optimal production and 
on the convex part of the profit curve, the increased mortality leads to increased willingness-
to-pay. On the opposite side, areas which are closer to their optimal production and on the 
concave part of the profit curve reduces their willingness-to-pay when introducing increased 
mortality. The increased rotation length compensates for the increased losses in both cases, 
which results in higher profits. This observation also indicates that the assumed number of 
recruits in this scenario is higher than that optimal number of recruits for all areas with binding 
capacity constraint. We can also observe that areas with non-binding capacity constraint will 
reduce their rotation length, while experiencing a profit loss. 
 
In sum, the economic effects of the Production Area Regulation will be larger in magnitude in 
areas which are furthest from optimal production, as they have the most to gain from a capacity 
increase. The high number of recruits in most production areas results in short rotation lengths. 
Production areas which find themselves far away from optimal production can increase profits 





option here is releasing less fish, as it makes little sense to release the same amount of fish and 
kill off larger amounts during the rotation. The total smolt costs will be reduced when reducing 
the number of recruits, which is also an advantage. Areas which are closer to optimal 
production are willing to pay relatively less for capacity increase when mortality rate 
increases. In areas 7, 12 and 13 the number of recruits is among the lowest in the industry. 
Combined with poorer growth conditions in the northernmost parts of Norway, these areas 
never reach their MAB limits and the areas realize lower profits when mortality increases. 
8.7.2 Changes in the Price Function 
The present value of future biomass is increasing in the parameters of the price function, which 
in turn leads to higher willingness-to-pay for capacity. Table 19 displays a numeric example 
with a 10 % increase in the parameters of the price function, which represents an upward shift 
in the function. 
Table 19 Increase in Coefficients of the Price Function by 10 % 
Area WTP Rotation length Weight per fish Profits 
1 294.29 (101.13 %) 13.77 (0.00 %) 2.48 (0.00 %) 72 766 740 (68.45 %) 
2 275.27 (86.12 %) 13.41 (0.00 %) 2.52 (0.00 %) 76 720 190 (66.22 %) 
3 176.14 (63.74 %) 16.58 (0.00 %) 3.79 (0.00 %) 94 021 613 (41.28 %) 
4 219.28 (72.93 %) 15.38 (0.00 %) 3.43 (0.00 %) 93 452 175 (44.90 %) 
5 290.49 (89.15 %) 11.99 (0.00 %) 2.31 (0.00 %) 75 948 077 (78.46 %) 
6 184.22 (61.57 %) 16.73 (0.00 %) 3.25 (0.00 %) 81 537 314 (47.25 %) 
7 0.00 (0.00 %) 21.07 (-5.16 %) 4.27 (-4.21 %) 73 489 711 (37.45 %) 
8 255.91 (88.14 %) 13.84 (0.00 %) 2.38 (0.00 %) 68 573 884 (73.55 %) 
9 246.66 (91.12 %) 14.46 (0.00 %) 2.35 (0.00 %) 64 405 836 (75.35 %) 
10 210.50 (84.87 %) 17.99 (0.00 %) 3.01 (0.00 %) 84 415 455 (51.62 %) 
11 165.03 (67.72 %) 19.94 (0.00 %) 3.15 (0.00 %) 79 547 456 (48.96 %) 
12 0.00 (0.00 %) 21.94 (-7.33 %) 3.34 (-5.57 %) 53 827 895 (43.92 %) 
13 0.00 (0.00 %) 22.20 (-7.37 %) 3.44 (-5.81 %) 54 533 728 (42.83 %) 
We observe that the increase in price results in an average increase in willingness-to-pay of 





weight per fish at harvest remain unchanged. The increase in price makes it more lucrative for 
areas with available capacity to reduce their rotation length as they are able to realize a 
relatively higher price for smaller fish and thus increase the number of rotations in the long 
run. The decision of buying additional capacity depends heavily on the fish farmers’ 
expectations of future price levels, and our model confirms that the economic effects of the 
Production Area Regulation varies according to the price development in the market. 
8.7.3 Changes in Cost 
Fish farmers’ expectations about future cost development will also affect the profitability of 
buying additional capacity, as a higher cost level decreases the present value of future biomass 
and the corresponding willingness-to-pay for capacity increase. We find that an increase in 
cost by 10 % results in an average reduction in willingness-to-pay of 7 % for locations with 
binding capacity, while the corresponding rotation length and weight per fish at harvest remain 
unchanged. Areas with available capacity find it more optimal to increase rotation length to 
realize a higher price, and thus reduce the decrease in profits when the costs increase. 
Table 20 Increase in Cost by 10 % 
Area WTP Rotation length Weight per fish Profits 
1 131.35 (-10.23 %) 13.77 (0.00 %) 2.48 (0.00 %) 17 949 595 (-58.45 %) 
2 137.21 (-7.22 %) 13.41 (0.00 %) 2.52 (0.00 %) 20 204 701 (-56.22 %) 
3 104.61 (-2.75 %) 16.58 (0.00 %) 3.79 (0.00 %) 45 729 982 (-31.28 %) 
4 120.99 (-4.59 %) 15.38 (0.00 %) 3.43 (0.00 %) 41 981 119 (-34.90 %) 
5 141.55 (-7.83 %) 11.99 (0.00 %) 2.31 (0.00 %) 13 421 174 (-68.46 %) 
6 111.38 (-2.32 %) 16.73 (0.00 %) 3.25 (0.00 %) 34 747 737 (-37.25 %) 
7 0.00 (0.00 %) 22.78 (2.52 %) 4.53 (1.77 %) 38 942 352 (-27.16 %) 
8 125.65 (-7.63 %) 13.84 (0.00 %) 2.38 (0.00 %) 14 404 149 (-63.55 %) 
9 118.44 (-8.23 %) 14.46 (0.00 %) 2.35 (0.00 %) 12 727 499 (-65.35 %) 
10 105.93 (-6.97 %) 17.99 (0.00 %) 3.01 (0.00 %) 32 500 687 (-41.62 %) 
11 94.92 (-3.54 %) 19.94 (0.00 %) 3.15 (0.00 %) 32 593 468 (-38.96 %) 
12 0.00 (0.00 %) 24.49 (3.45 %) 3.61 (2.00 %) 24 986 983 (-33.19 %) 





From this, it becomes evident that differences in cost level between fish farmers lead to 
heterogeneity in the effects of the Production Area Regulation. Cost efficient fish farmers will 
experience a relatively higher gain or loss related to the corresponding increase or decrease in 
capacity compared to less efficient fish farmers.  
8.7.4 Changes in Interest Rate 
To illustrate the model’s sensitivity for changes in interest rate, a scenario where the interest 
rate is increased by 4 % is displayed in Table 21. 
Table 21 Increase of 4 % in Interest Rate 
Area WTP Rotation length Weight per fish Profits 
1 87.05 (-40.51 %) 13.63 (0.00 %) 2,48 (0.00 %) 25 802 830 (-40.27 %) 
2 87.93 (-40.55 %) 13.24 (0.00 %) 2,52 (0.00 %) 27 584 608 (-40.23 %) 
3 62.86 (-41.57 %) 16.31 (0.00 %) 3,79 (0.00 %) 39 571 062 (-40.54 %) 
4 74.65 (-41.12 %) 15.15 (0.00 %) 3,43 (0.00 %) 38 422 399 (-40.42 %) 
5 91.62 (-40.35 %) 11.83 (0.00 %) 2,31 (0.00 %) 25 492 153 (-40.10 %) 
6 66.85 (-41.37 %) 16.45 (0.00 %) 3,25 (0.00 %) 32 918 588 (-40.55 %) 
7 0.00 (0.00 %) 22.09 (-0.58 %) 4,43 (-0.44 %) 31 503 411 (-41.08 %) 
8 80.83 (-40.57 %) 13.67 (0.00 %) 2,38 (0.00 %) 23 598 976 (-40.28 %) 
9 76.62 (-40.63 %) 14.28 (0.00 %) 2,35 (0.00 %) 21 915 073 (-40.33 %) 
10 66.93 (-41.21 %) 17.76 (0.00 %) 3,01 (0.00 %) 33 030 404 (-40.67 %) 
11 57.38 (-41.69 %) 19.62 (0.00 %) 3,15 (0.00 %) 31 581 626 (-40.86 %) 
12 0.00 (0.00 %) 23.56 (-0.48 %) 3,53 (-0.31 %) 21 986 061 (-41.22 %) 
13 0.00 (0.00 %) 23.84 (-0.51 %) 3,63 (-0.35 %) 22 433 801 (-41.24 %) 
It becomes evident that the increased interest rate decreases the present value of future 
rotations substantially due to higher discounting of future profits. On average, the future profits 
are reduced by 40.60 %. Willingness-to-pay is correspondingly reduced for all production 
areas where capacity is binding, while the rotation length and weight per fish at harvest remain 
unchanged. In the areas where capacity is non-binding the rotation length decreases as a result 





the sea reaches the level of the interest rate earlier than before, and thus the farmer should 
harvest earlier. 
 
We have in this section discussed and evaluated how changes in the underlying parameters of 
our empirical framework affect the willingness-to-pay for capacity increase, rotation length, 
weight per fish at harvest and present value of future profits. We were able to isolate the 
significance of the growth coefficients by setting the same number of recruits for all 
production areas. This exercise proved that areas with more favorable growth conditions have 
a higher willingness-to-pay for capacity increase compared to areas with worse growth 
conditions. We also found that an increase in mortality rate resulted in a better production 
optimization for areas where the capacity constraint was binding, indicating a suboptimal 
number of recruits. The corresponding change in willingness-to-pay was in both cases 
dependent on the areas’ deviation from optimal harvesting time.  
 
Furthermore, we found that the economic effects of the Production Area Regulation depend 
heavily on the price and cost development in the market, with an increase in willingness-to-
pay and present value of future profits as the price increases, and a decrease in the same 
parameters if the cost increases. Variation in price and cost levels between fish farmers leads 
to higher heterogeneity in the economic effects of the Production Area Regulation. Lastly, we 
found that the economic effects of Production Area Regulation depend heavily on the assumed 
interest rate, as a 4 % increase in interest rate reduced the present value of future profits with 
an average rate of 40.60 %. 
8.8 Current Price and Cost Levels 
The market situation today deviates considerably compared to the market perspective we 
presented in the previous sections in terms of prices and production costs. We will in this 
section present and comment on the results reflecting today’s price and cost level. 
 
Our original price function is derived using price data from 2005 until 2016, thus reflecting an 
average price over the last decade. In recent years, the salmon prices have been considerably 
higher, which directly increase the present value of future biomass. Price parameters reflecting 





Table 22 Updated Price per Kilogram 
 (1) 









Year FE Yes 
Month FE Yes 
N 364 
Adj. R-sq. 0.87 
Standard errors in parentheses. Month and year dummies not reported. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Compared to the original price model, we observe that all the parameters are considerably 
higher in absolute value, resulting in relatively higher prices. All coefficients are highly 
significant, and the adjusted R-squared is good. 
The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries has calculated an average production cost per kilo of 
30.60 NOK in 2016 (Fiskeridirektoratet, 2017a). The willingness-to-pay using today’s price 
level and production cost is presented in the table below. Optimal rotation length, weight per 
fish at harvest and present value of future profits are calculated after a 2 % capacity increase 






Table 23 Current Price and Cost Levels 
Area WTP Rotation length Weight per fish Profits 
1 400.61 13.77 (1.02 %) 2.48 (2.16 %) 397 463 334 (1.57 %) 
2 345.81 13.41 (1.30 %) 2.52 (2.23 %) 410 911 033 (1.31 %) 
3 200.05 16.58 (1.70 %) 3.79 (2.31 %) 371 667 130 (0.84 %) 
4 260.59 15.38 (1.53 %) 3.43 (2.24 %) 390 841 721 (1.04 %) 
5 369.84 11.99 (1.30 %) 2.31 (2.15 %) 448 706 806 (1.29 %) 
6 198.00 16.73 (1.73 %) 3.25 (2.33 %) 352 749 732 (0.88 %) 
7 0.00 20.22 (0.00 %) 4.11 (0.00 %) 275 638 992 (0.00 %) 
8 324.39 13.84 (1.30 %) 2.38 (2.17 %) 390 559 756 (1.30 %) 
9 317.91 14.46 (1.25 %) 2.35 (2.15 %) 371 928 760 (1.33 %) 
10 265.88 17.99 (1.28 %) 3.01 (2.20 %) 387 029 603 (1.30 %) 
11 185.95 19.94 (1.60 %) 3.15 (2.32 %) 352 332 112 (1.00 %) 
12 0.00 20.40 (0.00 %) 3.12 (0.00 %) 228 746 390 (0.00 %) 
13 0.00 20.63 (0.00 %) 3.20 (0.00 %) 227 807 031 (0.00 %) 
Similar to the scenario displayed in Table 13, we can observe that the increase in capacity 
results in an increase in rotation length with a corresponding increase in profit for all areas 
with binding capacity constraint. The average willingness-to-pay is 243 % higher compared 
to the results in Table 13, while the present value of future profit is, on average, 750 % higher. 
The standard deviation of willingness-to-pay is over twice as large compared to the 
willingness-to-pay in Table 13, and we can conclude that the magnitude of the economic 
effects, as well as the variation in the effects between the production areas, are considerably 
stronger under the price and cost assumptions made in this scenario.  
8.9 Discussion 
We will in this section provide a discussion of the profitability of buying growth, in addition 
to a discussion of the consequence of future regulative status of the production areas. Finally, 





8.9.1 Profitability of Buying Growth 
The willingness-to-pay for capacity increase differs substantially when comparing the scenario 
introduced in Section 8.4 and the scenario introduced in 8.8. When the most recent price and 
cost levels constitute the foundation of the analysis, it becomes profitable for 10 out of 13 
production areas to buy growth, as opposed to only 6 of 13 in the long-term perspective 
presented in Section 8.4. The fish farmers should consider the fact that the potential economic 
gain of investing in increased capacity will be realized over a long period of time. This aspect 
must be considered against the assumptions of price level and the future market development. 
Economic theory implies that profitable markets are a driver for market entries, leading to an 
increase in supply and a potential decrease in prices, which will reduce the producer surplus 
of each individual supplier. 
 
It is also reason to consider that the technological development in the aquaculture industry will 
increase the cost efficiency of novel production methods, like offshore and land-based fish 
farming, which can also pose a threat to incumbents. These production methods may also 
disrupt the natural competitive advantage of Norwegian fish farmers in the long run, namely 
the long coastline with favorable conditions. We find it highly relevant to consider the future 
technical and economic development in the market when deciding upon investing in capacity 
increase. 
 
Even though a positive change in profits implies that a potential investment in capacity 
increase is profitable, the fish farmers should consider a reasonable risk premium reflecting 
the uncertainty of future market development and their risk preference. When assessing the 
uncertainty of future market development, we also find it highly important to consider the risk 
of losing capacity if a production area becomes red. 
8.9.2 Future Regulative Status 
It is important to emphasize that the estimation of the present value of future profits only 
consider a one-time change in capacity, and that this capacity level remains fixed in all future 
time periods. In reality, the capacity may be adjusted in subsequent regulative periods, which 
will affect the present value of future profits accordingly. For example, green areas that 





and a higher expected value of future profits. In addition, the estimated economic loss may be 
lower for red areas that are imposed a capacity reduction today, as the reduction may be 
reversed if the infestation pressure decreases and the areas later become green. However, we 
find our empirical framework to be highly relevant to quantify the isolated economic gain or 
loss of a change in regulative status, given all available information. We find this 
simplification to be valid, as the expectation of future profits is highly uncertain and dependent 
on a large number of different factors. 
 
We emphasize that the magnitude of the results should be interpreted with consideration to the 
underlying assumptions, as these assumptions influence the results to a large degree. Still, the 
results illustrate the heterogeneity of the production areas well and the fact that there are 
substantial differences when evaluating the effects of the Production Area Regulation. 
Individual growth conditions, number of recruits and mortality rate are the main differentiating 
factors between the areas. 
 
Even though the magnitude of the effects is uncertain and dependent on the underlying 
assumptions, we find that our analysis is highly beneficial in estimating the expected net effect 
of commercial fish farmers’ decision of buying capacity increase. The net effect constitutes 
the estimated change in present value of future profits, taking into account the price of capacity 
increase. One may then use our empirical framework to evaluate if the purchase of capacity is 
a profitable decision for the fish farmers, considering all available information at that point in 
time. 
8.9.3 The Price of Growth 
The price for capacity increase should regulate both the demand of capacity increase to a 
sustainable level, as well as the proper distribution of the return of our natural resources 
between the fish farmers and the Norwegian Government. We wish not to comment on the 
latter, as it constitutes a central topic within the political discussion of taxation. It is worth 
noticing, however, that the economic surplus of the society as a whole will increase if the 
salmon production is increased in all areas with a positive willingness-to-pay, regardless of 
the distribution of profit between the government and the fish farmers. However, this is only 
true if the benefits resulting from increased production exceeds the costs. Increased production 





and these costs have to be taken into account when calculating the overall socio-economic 
effect of the regulation. The estimation of the socio-economic costs and benefits of the 
Production Area Regulation is an interesting topic for further research. 
 
Our analysis suggests that the price level of capacity increase of 120 NOK/kg is set very high 
from a long-term perspective. Considering diminishing returns on capacity increase, one may 
argue that the price of capacity increase should be reduced for each round of allotment. It is 
also worth noticing that the steadily increasing cost level makes the industry more vulnerable 
for fluctuations in prices through lower margins. If the Production Area Regulation increases 
the cost level, both directly or indirectly, it might be a contributor to a more vulnerable 
Norwegian industry. 
8.10 Limitations of the Model 
It is important to emphasize that the model reflects an average license for each area. The 
industry participants are highly heterogeneous in size, efficiency, geographic location and cost 
levels to mention some differentiating factors. As our results are presented as area averages, 
we emphasize that individual considerations of the different assumptions should be made in 
order to apply the results to individual licenses. Uncertainty in the variables from the data set, 
e.g. number of fish, also introduces uncertainty in the results. 
 
As described in Chapter 7, the growth and price model yield an underprediction of weight per 
fish and price, which in turn leads to an underprediction of change in the present value of 
future profit and willingness-to-pay. The underprediction of the economic effects leads to a 
larger potential gain of increased capacity, as well as a larger loss of an imposed capacity 
decrease. More accurate growth and price models should be used to further improve the 
economic analysis. 
 
The industry is changing rapidly, and the time frame of the data set is only until the end of 
2016. This means that the most recent data is not included, and the model should be updated 
to include these numbers when they become available to depict the most recent situation in 






The model does not manage to capture all aspects of salmon farming, and there might be 
operational characteristics of the production that we have not been able to take into account. 
Large companies enjoy flexibility in production planning due to large volumes of locations 
and licenses. The largest players enjoy further flexibility through inter-regional biomass 
levels, which in reality means that they have the opportunity to realize the growth in a different 
area than the growth was granted for. Such conditions are not implemented in the model and 
might influence our conclusions. 
 
The model fails to capture value creation from the industry as a whole, and we have to no 
degree aimed at estimating the socio-economic effects of the regulation. The results are 
therefore only fit to discuss the commercial effect of the regulation on license level. If aiming 
at determining the total effects of the Production Area Regulation, a broader approach should 
be undertaken, such as including the change in profits of suppliers and increased value creation 







We have in this thesis aimed at estimating the economic effects of the Production Area 
Regulation on commercial fish farming companies. We introduced an extension to the 
bioeconomic theory by including capacity constraints, which has enabled us to calculate how 
optimal rotation length is affected by the Production Area Regulation. By using an empirical 
growth and price model combined with the theoretical framework, we were able to calculate 
the change in profits resulting from changes in capacity, and the corresponding willingness-
to-pay for capacity increase for each production area.  
 
The analysis highlights the fact that farmers are forced to harvest earlier than what is 
economically optimal when facing capacity constraints. On average, farmers harvest over 6.5 
months before their optimal harvesting time, which translates to a 27 % reduction in rotation 
length. When introducing increased capacity of 2 %, the rotation length increases in all areas 
where the capacity constraint is binding, and the average willingness-to-pay for capacity 
increase is 99.10 NOK/kg. 
 
Evaluating the current status of the production areas, our analysis suggests that the average 
change in profits per license independent of area is 410 485, assuming that the 6 % growth is 
operationalized on existing licenses and that all licenses in red areas are imposed a 6 % 
reduction. Given the price of 120 NOK/kg for capacity increase, we find that it is only 
profitable for farmers in area 1, 8 and 9 to buy growth. 
 
Furthermore, we find that the economic effects of the regulation are diverse and driven by 
expectations regarding price level, costs, mortality rate, interest rate and growth conditions. 
Each farmer should therefor assess their own parameter values to determine their willingness-
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